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Abstract 
My dissertation chapters focus on economic development and economic growth. 
Chapter 1 investigates the effects of bilateral FDI flows on host countries’ productivity 
growth as well as on the productivity gap between host countries and the frontier 
country - USA. Using bilateral FDI flows data from 240 countries over 1990-2012, and 
employing fixed effects, 2-step GMM, and instrumental variable estimation methods, 
the empirical results show that there is no significant effect of bilateral FDI flows on 
either host countries’ productivity growth or on the productivity gap between host 
countries and the frontier country. There tends to be no significant effects of FDI on 
either host countries’ productivity growth or the productivity gap between host 
countries and the frontier. After decomposing the effects of FDI, we find FDI tends to 
promote host countries’ human capital growth, but only for South-South countries. No 
evidence shows FDI has any impact on either labor productivity or TFP by sector. 
 Chapter 2 uses spatial analytical skills to investigate aid effectiveness and aid 
spillovers at the sub-national level in Sub-Saharan Africa over the period 1995-2013. 
The previous literature examines aid-growth relationship and gets mixed results. One 
reason of the conflicting conclusions is that it suffers from the so-called “aggregation 
bias”. By using geocoded aid dataset and night lights data as proxy for economic 
activities, I am able to reveal more detailed pictures of aid effectiveness at different 
aggregate levels. Overcoming the potential simultaneity problem, I find that aid targeted 
at the local level tends to promote local economic growth, while aid received at more 
aggregate levels depresses local economic activities. One possibility is that more 
specifically targeted aid tends to be less fungible compared to “general” aid, while aid 
xi 
generally given to a more aggregated level is more likely to be misappropriated for 
other purposes, thus creating rent-seeking opportunities to cause corruption and hurt 
institutional environment. There exist positive spillovers of aid effectiveness across 
adjacent neighbors at the local level, probably due to total factor productivity 
improvement, technology and knowledge dissemination, and income effect. Aid at the 
local level promotes total economic flourish and slows down population growth, while 
aid at more aggregate levels depresses total economic activities but stimulates 
population growth. Aid directly received at all levels exhibits diminishing returns, 
which is consistent with the theory that aid directly stimulates investment and adds 
capital accumulation. While aid spillovers show weak increasing returns, which 
suggests the spillover effects partly function through technology and knowledge 
dissemination. As to the conditional aid effectiveness, no systematic story is found that 
aid is effective conditional on policy or institutions, probably due to data limitations that 
local policy and institutions data are unavailable in Sub-Saharan Africa. The findings 
have very profound policy implications that to promote local economic growth, we 
should focus more on specifically targeted and less-fungible aid projects rather than aid 
generally given to governments at more aggregate levels; also we should reduce barriers 
to resource movements and knowledge dissemination within the country to promote 
positive spillover effects. 
 Chapter 3 uses geographic information systems (GIS) skills to test the effects of 
foreign aid on conflict occurrences and fatalities at local level in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Using lagged aid variables as the instruments for current aid, negative relationship 
between current aid and future conflict is detected. Aid is effective to deter conflict 
xii 
when conflict events happening in short period or particular types of conflict events are 
under way. Income per capita, with night lights per capita as proxy, has non-linear 
impacts on conflict occurrences. Foreign aid can alleviate conflict and help Sub-Saharan 
countries to jump out of the low-income-conflict trap. 
1 
Chapter 1: Bilateral FDI, Productivity Spillovers and Growth 
Decomposition 
1.1. Introduction 
There have been numerous studies exploring the spillover channels through which 
economic exchanges between countries affect their productivity. Theoretically 
speaking, cross-border economic activities such as trade and investment flows or labor 
migration can affect involving countries’ production efficiency, gains from economic 
activities, or even long-run balanced growth path. 
 Foreign direct investment (FDI) is one of those activities. Through foreign 
companies’ investment activities, host countries may boost their production capabilities. 
The transmission of advanced technology, organizational patterns, managerial skills and 
know-how may accompany the FDI flows from home to host countries. The question 
we are interested in this article is to explore whether FDI inflows have any effects on 
host countries’ productivity growth. 
 The majority of previous literature focuses either on aggregate FDI flows or 
foreign investment at the micro level. In this article, we pay attention to the effects of 
bilateral FDI flows on host countries’ productivity dynamics at the macro level, a topic 
rarely investigated before. Also, since the effects of FDI may depend on the country 
types, we distinguish home and host countries along the North (i.e. developed countries) 
and South (i.e. developing countries). By separating the FDI effects between different 
country-type pairs, we provide a more nuanced picture about the spillover effects of 
FDI. 
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 We find that bilateral FDI inflows have no significant effects on either host 
countries’ productivity growth or the productivity gap between host countries and the 
frontier country. To gain a better understanding about the impact of FDI, we decompose 
the effects of bilateral FDI flows into physical capital growth and human capital. The 
results show there tends to be no significant effects of FDI on either host countries’ 
productivity growth or the productivity gap between host countries and the frontier. 
After decomposing the effects of FDI, we find FDI tends to promote host countries’ 
human capital growth, but only for South-South countries. No evidence shows FDI has 
any impact on either labor productivity or TFP by sector. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the literature 
review. Section 3 describes the data, empirical model and estimation methodology, and 
presents the empirical results. Section 4 introduces the robustness analysis. The 
decomposition analysis is displayed in Section 5 and the final section concludes. 
1.2. Literature Review 
The research on productivity spillovers has grown significantly since the 1990s, 
following closely the surge in global trade and financial flows during this period. The 
findings of this literature however, are quite heterogeneous. Among the possible 
channels, one strain of literature focuses on productivity spillovers through international 
trade. Madsen (2007) and Alcalá and Ciccone (2004) both find trade has large and 
significant effects on productivity growth and productivity convergence. The former 
attaches importance to knowledge transmission by international trade and the latter 
finds the international trade can increase total factor productivity (TFP). Likewise, there 
has been significant work exploring how research and development (R&D) activities 
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can affect different economies’ relative productivity dynamics (Coe and Helpman, 
1995; Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 1998; Keller, 1998; Engelbrecht, 1997). R&D capital 
is accumulated by R&D activities, just like FDI inflows can stimulate the accumulation 
of physical capital. Both of R&D and FDI activities can spur technological advances 
and knowledge dispersions in the host countries.  
 Most of the evidence on FDI productivity spillovers is based on micro level 
studies - either firm level or industry level, especially in manufacturing. As Devarajan, 
et al. (2001) point out, manufacturing technology is “closer to being universally 
available” within one country and it is not likely to be affected by natural forces, which 
makes it a primary candidate for productivity spillover investigations. Also, studies on 
productivity spillovers and FDI at micro level may provide some insights for macro 
level investigations, since under some conditions or assumptions, economic activities at 
micro level can be scaled up to macro level. Keller and Yeaple (2003) study trade and 
FDI related technology spillover effects among manufacturing firms in the United 
States over 1978-1996, and find that FDI accounts for a significant share of productivity 
gains while trade takes only a smaller part. Haddad and Harrison (1993) focus on 
manufacturing firms’ productivity in Morocco and find evidence that sectors with more 
foreign firms tends to have a smaller productivity dispersion, casting doubts on the 
subsidy policies granted to foreign firms, in the hope that foreign firms can bring 
advanced technology to domestic firms. Kokko et al. (1996) analyze changes in the 
technological gap between domestic firms and foreign firms in the Uruguayan 
manufacturing sector in 1998 and find the only firms with moderate technological gaps 
with foreign counterparts enjoy positive and statistically significant spillovers, 
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suggesting that FDI spillover effects are conditional on the technology gap between 
domestic and foreign firms. As such, the potential for spillovers between, for example, 
developing and developed country multinationals may be severely limited. Generalizing 
their conclusion to the macro level, we may argue that the gains from bilateral FDI 
become significant only when the host and home countries are not very different in 
terms of income levels or technological advancement, which is an empirical testable 
hypothesis. To this end, Barrios and Strobl (2002) use Spain’s accession to EU as a 
natural experiment to evaluate the FDI on productivity spillovers. Spain used to be 
characterized as a low productivity country before joining EU and since then, has 
attracted large amounts of FDI. They find that Spanish firms only with adequate 
absorptive capacity enjoy positive spillover effects. 
 As to FDI spillovers at the macro level, most of the previous literature 
investigates the effects of FDI on economic growth. Balasubramanyam et al. (1996) test 
the effects on growth in developing countries with different trade policies and find that 
FDI tends to have stronger effects on countries with outward-oriented policies than with 
inward-oriented trade policies. Borensztein et al. (1998) point out that FDI can promote 
economic growth only when the host country’s human capital passes a certain 
threshold, suggesting that the host country should have a sufficient absorptive capability 
to digest the advance technology brought by foreign firms. Choe (2003) shows that FDI 
Granger-causes growth and growth also Granger-causes FDI, but the results are more 
apparent from the direction of economic growth to FDI. Li and Liu (2005) find that FDI 
and economic growth have an increasingly endogenous relationship – FDI can promote 
growth, and the increased economic activities may attract more FDI to flow in. Doytch 
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and Uctum (2011) use country-level data and find that manufacturing FDI tends to 
increase economic growth in most of countries while service FDI may spur service 
sector’s growth but is likely to hurt manufacturing industries. 
 We argue that FDI is like a “composite bundle of capital stocks, know-how, and 
technology” and therefore, its effects on growth should be “manifold” (De Mello Jr, 
1997). FDI inflows can promote capital accumulation to increase economic growth, but 
we are interested in the “absorption” effects: after removing its effects on resource 
accumulation, how FDI can promote productivity in host countries? In other words, 
what we explore in this article is the growth effects generated by the increase in 
productivity. 
 Surprisingly, there has been only limited work done on FDI and productivity 
spillovers at the macro level. Kawai (1994) argues that productivity change is important 
to explain the growth patterns in developing countries; trade policies, productivity gap 
and macroeconomic stability may affect total factor productivity. De Mello Jr (1999) 
analyzes panel data over 1970-1990 and finds that FDI can boost growth in the host 
country by technological upgrading and knowledge spillovers, and the net effects of 
FDI on TFP depends on country-specific factors. 
 Most of the above literature focuses on aggregate FDI and related factors, and 
there have been only few studies using bilateral rather than aggregate FDI. To our best 
knowledge, there has been no previous literature on the effects of bilateral FDI on the 
productivity spillovers at macro level, and this article is the first one to target this topic. 
Using bilateral rather than total FDI allows us to take home countries’ characteristics 
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into consideration, and analyze whether FDI from different home countries could have 
differential effects on host countries’ productivity dynamics. 
 We believe the spillover effects of FDI inflows depend on the type of both host 
and home countries. Amighini and Sanfilippo (2014) analyze the export upgrading of 
African countries and find FDI inflows from South countries have different impact from 
North countries. Schiff and Wang (2008) investigate the trade-related technology 
diffusion and find that the effects also depend on whether the home country is a 
Northern country. Johnson (2006) places importance on host countries, and finds FDI 
tends to promote economic growth in developing countries but not developed countries. 
Dutt (2012) analyzes South-South and North-South interactions, and points out that 
there exist considerable intrinsic differences between the North and the South in terms 
of technology adaption, income elasticity of demand, sectoral structure of goods and 
services and other aspects. He also suggests that the South-South interactions (including 
emerging South) are not sufficient to serve as an engine of growth, and Southern 
countries still need interactions with the North, especially for technology transfer and 
markets. Bahar et al (2014) argue that technology diffusion decays with distance, and 
countries similar to each other are likely to do a better job in absorbing knowledge from 
each other. In consequence, we believe whether a country from the North or the South 
tends to affect its interaction with other countries, and the similarity between host and 
home countries is also important for technology transfer and knowledge diffusion. The 
exact effect of FDI flows for different country-type pairs is an empirical question which 
will be tested in the following chapters of this article. Here, we just want to mention that 
we distinguish the effects of different types for both host and home countries to 
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investigate the impact of FDI flows on South-South (S-S), North-South (N-S), South-
North (S-N) and North-North (N-N) countries. 
 Defining Northern and Southern countries is not a quite straightforward task. 
Based on the previous literature, we argue that compared to Southern countries, 
Northern countries have higher income, better technology, higher educational levels and 
more advanced managerial skills, so that FDI flows from Northern countries are 
supposed to bring advanced technology, managerial skills, and know-how, which are 
conducive to host countries’ productivity growth. After comparing the existing country 
group definitions, we find the often-used “high-income OECD countries” classification 
fits the above features. However, many of the newly existing definitions including the 
ones from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) define Northern 
countries based on current economic performance. Since our data span is 1990-2012, 
we want our selected Northern countries to be representative over the whole time 
period. We take the insights of the definitions from the World Bank and IMF, also 
Aykut and Ratha (2004), Aleksynska, Havrylchyk (2013) and the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), to create our own Northern 
country group. In the robustness check, we will use some alternative classifications to 
test whether our findings are sensitive to the definitions of Northern and Southern 
countries. 
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1.3. Empirical Analysis 
1.3.1. Model Speciation and Estimation Methodology 
We explore the effects of bilateral FDI on productivity growth dynamics using equation 
(1) below, which is based on Doytch and Uctum (2011), Bwalya (2006), Borensztein et 
al (1998), Choe (2003), and Balasubramanyam et al (1996): 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 ∗ ln 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑖 ∗ 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 +
𝛽3 ∗ 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑗 ∗ 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑖 ∗ 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑗 ∗ 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛾
′𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 +
𝑖,𝑡         (1)  
where 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡refers to the growth rate of country i’s productivity in year t, and 
  is the error term.  
 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡, which is our main focus of interest, is FDI inflows from country j to 
country i as a share of country i’s GDP over time t. As is the general practice, we 
normalized FDI by host country’s GDP to correct for size and scale difference between 
host countries and FDI flows. We follow the conventions and use the order home-host 
countries as the country pair in which FDI inflows from home country to host country. 
In this model, the impacts of FDI flows on host countries’ average productivity growth 
for S-S, N-S, S-N and N-N country pairs are 𝛽1, 𝛽1 + 𝛽3, 𝛽1 + 𝛽2, and 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3 +
𝛽4, respectively. Since there is no previous literature about this topic to give us insights 
for result expectations, we leave it an open question and will give our results in the 
following subsections. We will also discuss the measurement of productivity more in 
depth later in this section.  
 𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 is the logarithm of GDP per capita in country i in year t-1, a 
proxy for initial income. The parameter 𝛼 shows the effects of the lagged income level 
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on the growth rate of TFP. We may expect richer countries are better at promoting 
productivity, but countries lagged behind may have the advantage of catching up so 
probably they enjoy fast productivity growth in the transitory period. 
  𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of country i’s characteristics, including: 
 Inflation rate, measured by the percentage change of GDP deflator. High 
inflation rate may cause distortions and create inefficiencies in resource allocation, 
harming economic growth as well as productivity (Fischer, 1993; Bitros et al, 2006). 
But Kumar et al (2012) find only limited effect of inflation on sectoral productivity in 
Australia from 1965 to 2007. Likewise, Freeman and Yerger (2000) show there is no 
consistent relationship between inflation and productivity in 12 OECD nations over 
1954-1996. Therefore, the expectation of inflation’s impact on productivity growth is 
not very clear. 
 Openness to trade, measured by the sum of import and export as a share of GDP, 
reflects how open a country is to the rest of the world in terms of trade. Miller and 
Upadhyay (2000) find that higher openness tends to increase productivity. Similarly, 
Edwards (1998) using data from 93 countries over 1960-1990, shows that higher 
productivity growth is associated with more open countries. However, Rodriguez and 
Rodrik (2001) find little evidence that open trade policy promotes economic 
performance. Therefore, the impact of openness on productivity is still an open 
question. 
 Government consumption as a share of GDP is usually used as the measure of 
government size, which may affect the resource allocation between private and public 
sector as well as government policies. Increasing public sector size may cause 
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inefficiencies and create distortions to the market. Peden and Bradley (1989), for 
example, find that increased government size is associated with reduction in economic 
performance. However, Ram (1986) shows there tends to be a positive relationship 
between government size and productivity among 115 countries, perhaps due to the 
“externality” and “crowding-in” effects of government sector on the rest of the whole 
economy. The effect of government size on productivity is an empirical question and 
needs to be investigated. 
 The share of domestic credit to private sector (as % of GDP), a proxy for 
financial development, is a measure for financial resources given to the private sector. 
Guillaumont Jeanneney et al (2006) investigate productivity in China and find financial 
development has significant contribution to productivity growth. Alfaro et al (2004; 
2009) investigate the indirect effects of financial development on productivity, pointing 
out that only with well-developed financial markets, FDI is beneficial to economic 
performance and total factor productivity. Therefore, we expect financial development 
has a positive effect on productivity. 
 In order to estimate Eq. (1), probably the simplest method is to use pooled OLS 
as suggested by the standard econometric textbooks, which assumes homogeneity 
among countries over time (Greene, 2011; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). However, this 
assumption is subject to specification error and fails to take country-specific 
characteristics into consideration. The omitted variable and potential endogeneity 
problems may lead to biased estimates. Therefore, we choose to add fixed effects to 
control for the unobserved country-specific time-invariant and time-varying effects, and 
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use the IV method for the potentially endogenous variables. In this specification, we 
used the lagged FDI (in years t-2 and t-3) as instruments for FDI in year t-1. 
 Since the further lagged FDI variables are used as instruments for lagged FDI, 
we should test whether the instruments are: (i) valid, being orthogonal to the error term, 
and (ii) not weak, being able to explain the variation of lagged FDI based on some 
statistical criteria. The validity of instruments is tested by the over-identification test, 
which checks whether the model is correctly specified. The weak instrument issue is 
tested by Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic (where the null hypothesis the chosen variables 
being weak instruments). Stock and Yogo (2005) has put forward the critical values 
under different criteria or using different parameters, which can be used as reference 
whether the F-statistic is large enough to reject the null hypothesis. 
 The specification (1), however, does not allow us to test whether FDI flows help 
stimulate convergence between host countries and the productivity frontiers. 
Particularly speaking, whether FDI inflows shrink or widen the productivity gap 
between host and frontier countries is an issue that remains unanswered. Therefore, to 




) = 𝛼 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑖 ∗ 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∗
𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑗 ∗ 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑖 ∗ 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑗 ∗ 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛾′𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿𝑡 +




) is the relative productivity level of the country i compared to country j. 
The βs indicate whether there is productivity convergence between the two countries. In 
the following regressions, we investigate the impact of FDI inflows on relative 
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productivity between host country i and the frontier country USA. In the robustness 
check, we also use the weighted average of G-7 countries as the productivity frontier. 
1.3.2. Measurement of Total Factor Productivity 
Productivity is usually interpreted as the ratio of output to input. To increase total 
output, one has to increase either input (accumulation) or productivity or both, and the 
former represents the movement along the same production function curve while the 
latter refers to the shift of the production function. This paper investigates whether the 
inflows of FDI can lead to spillover effects on host country’s productivity. One reason 
why this paper uses productivity rather than growth is that it is more closely related to 
new technology innovation or adoption (Eaton and Kortum, 1996). One problem for 
using productivity is that there are different measurements of productivity and they can 
lead to different results even if used in the same empirical test. In applied 
macroeconomic analysis, productivity can be measured in multiple ways (Bernard and 
Jones, 1996): (i) labor productivity, measured by GDP per capita or per worker; (ii) 
total factor productivity (TFP), measured by Solow residual; (iii) total technological 
productivity (TTP). TTP shows which country can produce more if granted the same 
amount of inputs. Since TTP is usually not directly comparable and depends heavily on 
the production function’s form, this paper uses TFP as the main measurements of 
productivity. 
 However, TFP can be more than technology advancement. Hulten (2001) 
summarizes the rich literature of TFP and points out that TFP can also be organizational 
innovation and improvement in efficiency (which are wanted), and measurement error 
and omitted variables (which are unwanted). This measurement of our ignorance cannot 
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be better solved at this time, and we accept TFP as the proxy for the “wanted” aspect – 
technology advancement, organizational innovation and other forms in efficiency gains. 
 The traditional way of calculating TFP is the growth accounting (Hulten, 2001). 
The idea of growth accounting is using the overall growth minus the share due to the 
increase of inputs, so the residual is viewed as the growth part due to technology 
advancement. There is lots of criticism of growth accounting, because it requires strong 
assumption of perfect competition, payment to each input by its marginal product, and 
correct specification of production function, which seem not so realistic in the real 
world. However, since growth accounting is still a widely used way of calculating TFP, 
and it is easy to compare with other studies about productivity spillovers, growth 
accounting is used in this paper as the primary way of calculating TFP. 
 The starting point is to assume the form of the general production function. 
Some simplifying assumptions are applied for the convenience of computation in the 
previous literature. First, the technology advancement is Hicks neutral, so that it can be 
separated from the inputs variables. Second, the inputs market is competitive and each 
input is paid by its marginal product, so that we do not need to calculate output 
elasticities and can use the income shares of the inputs instead. The general production 
function has the form: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐾𝑖,𝑡
𝛼 ∗ (𝐿𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑖,𝑡)
𝛽             (3) 
Yi,t is the total output, and Ki,t, Li,t and Hi,t are capital, labor and human capital in country 
i at time t. Ai,t is believed to be the technology level at time t, which is the variable of 
interest – TFP. The coefficients α and β are the income shares of capital and labor, 
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respectively. In this production function, α and β vary across countries and across time1. 
Under the assumption of constant returns to scale, α+β=1. 
We can transform it by taking the logarithmic differential of the above function. 
We follow Griffith et al (2004) and Cameron et al (2005) to use the superlative index 
based on the translog production function. One of the biggest advantage of the translog 
production function is that it allows for more flexible elasticities. The superlative index 
is developed by Diewert (1976), and a functional form being “superlative” means that 
there exists second-order approximation to a twice differentiable linearly homogenous 
function. The superlative index has been widely used to investigate production, cost or 
utility functions, and it can approximate any of these smooth functions. Törnqvist index 
is a widely-used superlative index, which uses the average value shares in the 
consecutive periods as weights. In this article, we use the average income shares 
between period t and t-1 as the proxy for output elasticities to calculate the growth rate 
of TFP at t.  
∆𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = ∆𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +
1
2
∗ (𝛼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖,𝑡−1) ∗ ∆𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + (1 −
1
2




∗ (𝛼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖,𝑡−1)) ∗ ∆𝑙𝑛𝐻𝑖,𝑡                           (4) 
 To get the growth rate of Ai,t, we subtract the growth rates of capital and labor 
from the total output growth, and the residual is the so-believed TFP2. 
                                                 
1 We also follow the standard assumption and make α equal to 2/3 and β 1/3, and find the results are 
highly correlated with the baseline specification. 
2 Some articles such as Van Beveren (2012) use other estimations to calculate firm’s TFP, such as IV and 
GMM, because firm’s inputs are endogenous and depend on firm’s characteristics such as efficiency, 
there is entry and exit of firms to make attrition or selection bias problem, and there might be omitted 
price bias for inputs and outputs. These considerations are not likely to be relevant of or not big concerns 
of macroeconomic TFP calculations at country level. So this article follows the previous literature to use 
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𝐻𝑖,𝑡
𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1
)                                (5) 
 The above equation defines the relative productivity of country i at time t 
compared to its previous period. Also, we can follow Cameron et al (2005) to get the 
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∗ (𝛼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑗,𝑡)) ∗ 𝑙𝑛(
𝐻𝑖,𝑡
𝐻𝑗,𝑡
)               (6)          
 In this equation, we use the average income shares of country i and j at t. In 
Griffith et al (2004), the relative TFP are calculated in comparison with the geometric 
mean of all countries’ productivity levels, and then the difference of the relative TFP 
levels between country i and j are computed as TFP gap. The idea behind the two 
methods is very similar, except that the latter has a common comparison point and so 
the relative TFP are transitive. The relative levels of TFP between two countries allows 
us to investigate the possible productivity convergence. 
1.3.3. Data 
The majority of bilateral FDI data come from the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD). OECD data set has bilateral FDI information between 
North-North, North-South and South-North countries over 1990-2012. UNCTAD 
dataset includes bilateral FDI for both North and South countries over 1990-2012. To 
merge the two datasets, we give the priority to OECD dataset since we believe the 
developed countries have better capabilities of collecting and organizing data; for 
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UNCTAD dataset, the FDI inflow from country j to country i should be equal to the 
FDI outflow from country j to country i, and we follow the host country first if they are 
not equal. The bilateral FDI data have been normalized as a share of the host country’s 
GDP. 
 For TFP calculation, we use GDP data in constant 2005 US dollars from the 
World Development Indicators (WDI), total labor force from WDI, human capital as the 
years of schooling and returns to education, and labor income shares from the Penn 
World Tables (PWT), and gross capital formation in constant 2005 US dollars from 
WDI. We also use alternative capital data sources such as capital stock at current PPPs 
in constant 2005 US dollars from PWT, and find the calculated TFPs are highly 
correlated with our initial results. To preserve the most observations, we use gross 
capital formation data from WDI. 
 Figure 1 displays FDI flows as a share of host countries’ GDP categorized by 
country-type pairs. We can see there exists big variation in S-S vs. N-S groups. One 
reason for this pattern is that some Southern countries have relatively smaller economic 
sizes, so moderate amounts of FDI inflows may lead to significant ratio of FDI to their 
GDP. Northern home countries invest a bigger share in both Southern host countries 
and Northern host countries, indicating the North is the major source of FDI outflows. 
Bigger fluctuations and more points are observed in later years than in the earlier year, 
indicating potential missing FDI values as time goes back to the beginning of our time 
period. Figure 3 shows the numbers of observations for bilateral FDI flows by year, 
which shows the unbalanced panel structure and there are only a few observations in the 
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earlier years. We leave the potential sample selection problem to the robustness check 
in Section 4. 
 Figure 2 shows the scatter plots for TFP growth rates in South and North 
countries, respectively. The TFP growth rates of both country groups are around 0%, 
but there is a higher variation among Southern than Northern countries.  
 Country characteristics are taken from various sources. Import and export as a 
share of GDP, inflation rate, government consumption as a share of GDP, and the share 
of domestic credit to private sector are from WDI.  
 Table 1 shows the main data sources for the main variables and Table 2 gives 
summary statistics of the data. 
1.4. Empirical Results 
1.4.1. Baseline Empirical Results 
Table 3 and Table 4 show the baseline regression results for equation (1) and equation 
(2), respectively. We introduce both country and year fixed effects to control the 
country-specific and time-specific effects. The p-value of Hansen over-identification 
test and Cragg-Donald F statistic are large enough in all the specifications to justify the 
instruments are valid and not weak at traditional significance levels. 
 In Table 3, we use fixed effects in the first four columns and 2-step GMM in the 
last four columns. In columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6), we just use the FDI as a share of the 
host countries’ GDP and do not consider any country type. While in columns (3)-(4) 
and (7)-(8), we distinguish the country-type pairs and estimate the impacts of FDI flows 
on host countries’ productivity growth for S-S, N-S, S-N, and N-N pairs, respectively. 
Country characteristics are included in Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8). The first column 
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displays the results of a stripped-down model, without taking into account country type 
or any country characteristics. The lagged FDI inflows are positive but insignificant at 
conventional levels. Host countries’ lagged income has a positive and very significant 
effect on its current productivity growth, indicating richer host countries are better at 
promoting productivity growth. Column (2) introduces host countries’ characteristics. 
Lagged FDI inflows still have positive but insignificant effect, and the coefficient of 
initial income is positive and significant at 0.01 level. Inflation rate is negative but not 
significant, indicating weak evidence showing higher inflation rate is associated with 
lower productivity growth. Openness to trade is negative and significant at conventional 
levels, which means after controlling for other factors, openness tends to harm 
productivity growth in host countries. The negative effect is not consistent with much of 
the previous literature (Harrison, 1996; Miller and Upadhyay, 2000). However, there 
are also some empirical studies showing the relationship between openness and 
productivity or economic performance is not conclusive (Edwards, 1998; Rodriguez and 
Rodrik 2001)3. As a result, we may not feel very surprised about the possible negative 
signs here4. Government consumption as a share to GDP has no significant effect on 
productivity growth. Domestic credit to private sector has positive and highly 
significant impacts, indicating better financial development in the host country tend to 
promote its productivity growth after controlling for other variables. However, the 
coefficients of country characteristic variables should be interpreted with caution. First, 
some of the previous literature tests the impacts of these characteristics on economic 
performance by using different model specifications. When we are adding additional 
                                                 
3 For example, Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) claim that openness may not serve as an adequate proxy for 
policy considerations and may be prone to measurement error.  
4 We also exclude the openness to trade in the regressions and get essentially the same result. 
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variables into our model, if the new variables are correlated with our characteristics, the 
coefficients of these characteristics are very likely to change or even switch signs or 
jump between being significant and insignificant. As a result, we should not expect our 
results about country characteristics have certain similarity with the previous literature. 
Second, the host country’s characteristics are potentially endogenous, and thus their 
coefficients are likely to be biased5. But what we need is the accurate estimation of 
coefficients of our variables of interest – lagged FDI flows, and the coefficients of the 
country characteristics are not our big concern. In our model, we use more lagged FDI 
as instruments to solve the potential endogeneity problem of lagged FDI, which is able 
to correct the bias on FDI coefficients based on some statistical criteria. Third, the 
coefficients only tell the direct estimated effects of controls on the dependent variable 
under our model specification, while the overall effects (direct plus indirect effects) 
could be very different. 
 In Column (3) and (4), we estimate the effects of FDI inflows for different 
country-type pairs. Column (3) is a bare bone specification which does not include 
country characteristics, while Column (4) is our preferred specification which includes 
not only the country types but also country characteristics. The results for the two 
columns are essentially the same as Columns (1) and (2), except that the FDI effects 
between different country types are included. The coefficients of FDI for S-S, N-S, S-N, 
and N-N display either positive or negative signs, but all of them are insignificant at any 
conventional levels, which means FDI inflows may not be the key factor to promote 
host countries’ productivity. 
                                                 
5 Theoretically, we can use lagged variables as instruments for each potentially endogenous variables to 
correct their estimates. But that will eat the degrees of freedom and may create additional biases which 
may affect the coefficients of our variables of interest. 
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 In Columns (5)-(8), we follow the specifications of first four columns and use 2-
step GMM regressions. We get slightly different but essentially the same results. 
 Table 4 displays the results from equation (2), in which we use host country as 
country i and USA as the frontier country f. Since USA is believed to be the 
productivity frontier in most industries (Bartelsman et al, 2008; Cameron et al, 2005), 
we use this equation to test whether there exists conditional productivity convergence 
between the host country and the frontier, or in other words, whether FDI inflows can 
promote host country’s productivity convergence toward the frontier after controlling 
for other factors. The results are not very promising, and we do not detect any 
significant productivity convergence effect of FDI flows. In all the specifications, the p-
value of Hansen over-identification test is large enough not to reject the null hypothesis 
that the model is correctly specified, and Cragg-Donald F statistic is large enough to 
reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments. 
 The coefficients of the control variables does not change much except for 
openness to trade and financial development. Openness to trade tends to promote host 
country’s productivity convergence toward the frontier country, which is consistent 
with most of the previous literature. Financial development has negative impact on 
productivity convergence, which is not consistent with our previous results. However, 
we can take insights from Loayza and Ranciere (2006), who find that financial 
development might be negatively correlated with economic performance in the short 
run due to financial fragility in the transitionary period6.  
 The literature about FDI and productivity convergence at macro level is very 
limited so we take insights from other relevant topics to discuss our findings. Mayer-
                                                 
6 Excluding financial development does not affect our conclusion. 
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Foulkes and Nunnenkamp (2009) investigate FDI and per-capita income convergence 
relative to USA and find that FDI flows tend to accelerates convergence for high-
income countries while increase the gap between low-income countries and USA. If the 
same pattern is true for productivity, it is not surprising to see overall an insignificant 
effect is detected since the positive and negative effects may cancel out each other. Lee 
(2009) finds FDI flows tend to contribute to productivity convergence in manufacturing 
sector, but not as effective as trade and not in service sector. Based on his findings, it is 
possible that FDI flows have no significant effect on host countries’ overall 
productivity. 
1.4.2. Sensitivity Analysis 
FDI inflows as a share of host country’s GDP are negative for some countries over 
some periods, which means these countries experience net FDI outflows by non-
residents. Since FDI inflows are supposed to bring advanced technology, managerial 
skills, and know-how to host countries, FDI’s productivity spillovers are supposed to 
take place in the net FDI-receiving countries. Also, we find several countries have zero 
FDI inflows from their partners, and we are not sure whether they are true zeroes or due 
to missing values. Following our benchmark specification (Columns (4) and (8) in 
Table 3), in Table 5 we keep non-negative FDI inflows in Columns (1) and (6), and 
only keep positive FDI inflows in Columns (2) and (7). The results are essentially 
identical to our baseline results. 
 As a second robustness check, we control for the heavily right-skewed nature of 
the FDI flows’ distribution. Many observations of FDI inflows are very small compared 
to the host countries’ economic size. The 75 percentile of FDI inflows as a share of host 
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country’s GDP is only 0.00448, which might be a reason why FDI inflows tend to have 
insignificant effect on productivity spillovers. In Columns (3) and (8), we report the 
regression results by only using FDI inflows as a share of GDP equal to or above 0.17, 
and once again, no significant result is found. 
 Third, we control for sensitivity of our results to the numbers of sources of FDI 
flows. The dependent variable of equation (5) is home country invariant, which means 
productivity of one host country may correspond to many FDI sources at home country-
year level. If some host countries have only a limited source of their FDI inflows (only 
a few home country-year pairs) while other host countries have tremendous amounts of 
sources (huge amounts of investing country-year pairs), the regression results may be 
dragged by the countries with tremendous amounts of sources and thus be potentially 
biased. Figure 4 displays the distribution of home country-year pair for host countries 
and we can see the distribution is right-skewed. In Column (4), we keep the host 
countries with the number of home country-year below the 75 percentile (617), and the 
results are essentially the same8. 
 Figure 1 shows FDI flows as a share of host countries’ GDP. Figure 3 displays 
the number of observations for bilateral FDI flows for each year. We can see that there 
are less and less observations as well as smaller and smaller fluctuations as we go back 
to earlier years. In other words, we see more and more missing values as we go from 
forth to back. The unbalanced panel data potentially bring sample selection problem. If 
the missing values are not randomly distributed, fixed effects and 2-step GMM might 
                                                 
7 We also use FDI share beyond alternative thresholds and find the results are essentially the same. 
8 We test different thresholds and the conclusion is not affected. The conclusion is also true for those 
above 75 percentile. The regression results are not very likely to be drive by home country-year pair, but 
we also test this case and still get essentially the same results. 
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lead to biased results, and that is perhaps why we got insignificant effects in the 
previous regressions. If we knew the reason why the dataset is unbalanced, we could 
have figured out the way to deal with it. Unfortunately, we do not have enough 
information to build a perfectly corrected model to solve this problem. Perhaps one may 
be tempted to create a balanced panel in which we have the same number of 
observations for each year. However, we are creating bias if the pattern of missing 
values is systematic. Also, one may think about using some censored or truncated 
models instead. However, our FDI as a share of GDP can take both positive and 
negative value and is not censored or truncated at any specific level. To correct the 
potential sample selection bias, we have to think about alternative way to settle this 
problem. To this end, we introduce an indicator, which equals to one if the FDI value is 
not missing and zero otherwise. We add the lagged indicators up to some periods to 
control for the occurrence pattern. If there is some systematic reason for some countries 
to receive FDI inflows, the past presence indicators should have taken it into 
consideration. In Column (6), we include the lagged indicator up to 10 periods and still 
find insignificant results for FDI flows. We also use lagged indicator with varying 
periods and get essentially the same results, which indicates the unbalanced panel may 
not be a big problem for our conclusion.  
 How about the sensitivity of our results to the definition of North and South? 
Since we have created our own Northern country group and assigned all the other 
countries to the Southern group, there might be concern that our results are sensitive to 
the definitions of Northern or Southern countries. In Table 69, we follow the category 
                                                 
9 To save space, we only report the coefficients and standard deviations of FDI variables from fixed 
effects models. Results of 2-step GMM models are very similar. 
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“high income OECD members” from WDI 10  in Column (1) and also “Advanced 
Economies” from IMF11 in Column (2). The results show that the effects of FDI flows 
on host countries’ productivity growth are indistinguishable from zero at conventional 
significance levels. 
 Instead of clear distinction between Northern and Southern countries, there are 
some emerging countries12 that share some characteristics of Northern countries, but fall 
short of the standards of developed countries. Compared to typical Southern countries, 
these emerging countries are more like their advanced counterparts. In Column (3) of 
Table 6, we redefine both developed and emerging countries as Northern countries and 
all other countries in the South group. The reclassification results still show that no 
significant effect is detected. 
 We have shown that potential self-selection bias does not affect our conclusion 
by introducing lagged indicators. Also we want to know whether our results are robust 
to alternative time spans. The period 1990-1995 only accounts for 10% of the whole 
observations of bilateral FDI flows. In Column (4) we drop this time span and only use 
years after 1995. We do not find any significant result over the shorten time period. 
                                                 
10 It includes: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Israel, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. 
11 It includes: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong (China), Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Israel, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Singapore, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom and United States. 
12 We take the insights from IMF, FTSE, Standard & Poor’s, Dow Jones and other sources to create our 
emerging country group, which includes: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand and 
Turkey. 
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 It is possible that our results are driven by the outliers. In Columns (5) and (6), 
we drop the upper 1% and lower 1% countries based on their normalized FDI inflows 
and income per capita. We do not find any effects that are distinguishable from zero. 
 Instead of dropping either negative FDI or non-positive FDI flows in the 
previous analysis, in Column (7) we introduce dummies for zero FDI and negative FDI 
flows. If host countries receive either zero or negative FDI, the corresponding dummy is 
assigned to 1. The regression results still show that FDI flows tend to have insignificant 
effect on host countries’ productivity growth. 
 Since we run one regression for different country-type combinations Eq. (1), we 
are restricting other variables to have the same marginal grouped across the 
combination types. In Column (8), we use alternative specification displayed in 
Equation (7) and allow different marginal effects of other variables on host countries’ 
productivity growth13. Once again, we do not find any essentially different results.  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖=𝑆 𝑜𝑟 𝑁,𝑗=𝑆 𝑜𝑟 𝑁,𝑡−1 + 𝛾′𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 +
𝑖,𝑡         (7)  
 We are concerned whether our results are sensitive to selected regions. In Table 
7, we drop each region once based on WDI regional classifications14. All the regression 
results show that FDI flows have insignificant impact on host countries’ productivity 
growth. We also apply the same procedures in Table 6 and Table 7 to productivity 
convergence and get similar conclusions15. 
                                                 
13 We run 4 separate regressions for S-S, N-S, S-N and N-N countries. To save space, we only report the 
results for FDI variables in one column. 
14 To save space, only the results of fixed effects models are reported. The results of 2-step GMM are 
essentially identical. 
15 To save space, the results are not reported. 
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 In Table 4, we have reported the results of Equation (2), where we put USA as 
the productivity frontier. In Table 8, we use G7 group16 (major advanced economies) as 
frontier instead and follow the specifications of Columns (4) and (8) in Table 4. We use 
unweighted average of these 7 countries in Columns (1) and (5), which means each G7 
country receives equal importance for GDP, physical capital, labor, human capital, and 
as a result, productivity. In Columns (2) and (6), we use GDP as the weight to calculate 
the composite relative productivity, with countries having larger economic size 
receiving more importance. In Columns (3) and (7), we use population as weight to 
consider the country size when calculating relative TFP. Also we are concerned that 
richer countries may have unique advantages in promoting productivity, so we use GDP 
per capita (a proxy for richness) as the weight to get relative productivity in Columns 
(4) and (8).  All the regressions show insignificant impact of FDI flows on productivity 
convergence of host countries toward TFP frontier. 
1.5. The Decomposition of Effects of FDI Inflows 
Some of the previous literature has found significant effects of FDI on GDP growth 
rates. We focus on FDI and productivity spillovers, and total factor productivity is 
viewed as a residual after excluding the contribution of capital, labor and human capital 
from overall economic growth rates. In order to have an overall look at the effects of 
FDI, this section decomposes its effects to different components of the growth rates. We 
apply equation (1) and replace the productivity growth rates with physical capital 
growth rates and human capital growth rates. 
 Table 9 shows the effects of FDI on the growth rates of capital and human 
capital. Columns (1) and (2) display the impact of un-directed FDI inflows on host 
                                                 
16 It includes: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and United States. 
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countries’ capital growth rates, and Columns (5) and (6) show the effects of un-directed 
FDI on host countries’ human capital growth rate. Columns (3), (4) and (7), (8) display 
the effects of directed FDI on host countries’ capital growth and human capital growth. 
FDI tends to have no impact on host countries’ capital growth but it is likely to promote 
human capital growth. Once we use the directed FDI, only South-South pair shows 
statistical significance for human capital growth. 
 So far, we have not found any evidence that FDI can either promote host 
countries’ productivity growth or shrink the productivity gap between host countries 
and the frontier. However, it is likely that FDI can be effective in one particular sector. 
We test the impacts of FDI on growth and convergence of labor productivity and TFP in 
three sectors: agriculture, industry and service. The Sectoral value added and 
employment data are from WDI and Sectoral capital formation data are from OECD. 
Once again, we do not detect any significant effects of FDI17. 
1.6. Conclusion 
This article investigates the effects of bilateral FDI on productivity spillovers. First, it 
uses the host countries’ productivity growth rates as dependent variable, and then uses 
the gap of productivities between host countries and frontier country USA as dependent 
variable. In order to solve the potential endogeneity and omitted variable problems, we 
use fixed effects, 2-step GMM and instrumental variables to correct the potential 
biasedness. 
 The results show there tends to be no significant effects of FDI on either host 
countries’ productivity growth or the productivity gap between host countries and the 
frontier. After decomposing the effects of FDI, we find FDI tends to promote host 
                                                 
17 To save space, regression results are not reported. 
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countries’ human capital growth, but only for South-South countries. No evidence 
shows FDI has any impact on either labor productivity or TFP by sector. 
 Our findings show that there still exists enormous scope for the improvement of 
the effectiveness and contribution of FDI flows. Instead of attracting FDI flows without 
discrimination, host countries are supposed to distinguish which FDI flows are 
conducive to the growth rates of either productivity or other components, and which 
FDI flows only crowd out domestic investment to hurt capital accumulation. Perhaps 
some countries do not have the capability of screening at this time, but those mentioned 
above are possible in the future. 
 Out work is restricted by the limitation of the data. For example, we do not 
know much about the missing FDI observations in the early years. Perhaps with more 
data in the future, we can do better work based on bilateral FDI flows. 
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Table 1.1: Data Sources for the Main Variables 
 Data Sources 
Bilateral FDI OECD (2013), UNCTAD (2013) 
GDP per capita WDI (2015) 
Labor force WDI (2015) 
Human capital PWT (2015) 
Gross capital formation WDI (2015) 
Import and export as a share of GDP WDI (2015) 
Inflation rate WDI (2015) 
Government consumption as a share of GDP WDI (2015) 







Table 1.2: Summary Statistics of the Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
      
Bilateral FDI (%) 139,625 0.137 2.492 -95.33 99.03 
Productivity growth rate (%) 1,931 0.000417 0.140 -2.711 2.419 
Relative TFP (Compared to USA) 2,083 -0.682 0.615 -3.051 1.510 
GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) 4,083 10,095 16,422 50.04 158,803 
GDP (constant 2005 million US$) 4,282 223,466 972,499 16.04 1.414e+07 
Gross capital formation (constant 2005 million US$) 3,067 71,573 258,481 -16.97 3.172e+06 
Labor force (million) 4,215 15.31 63.14 0.0321 787.6 
Human capital 2,924 2.412 0.571 1.129 3.619 
Labor income share 2,772 0.530 0.137 0.0897 0.917 
Import and export as a share of GDP (%) 4,109 86.28 51.75 0.309 531.7 
Inflation rate (%) 4,273 45.62 541.3 -31.57 26,766 
Government consumption as a share of GDP (%) 3,927 16.43 8.355 2.047 156.5 
Domestic credit to private sector (%) 3,713 45.89 44.37 0.491 319.5 
      








Table 1.3: Baseline Regression Results – Productivity Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 2-step GMM 2-step GMM 2-step GMM 2-step GMM 
FDI 0.00362 0.00373   0.00352 0.00363   
 (0.00328) (0.00340)   (0.00328) (0.00340)   
FDI (S-S)   0.0151 0.0208   0.0141 0.0218 
   (0.0147) (0.0196)   (0.0146) (0.0196) 
FDI (N-S)   -1.29e-05 0.000381   -0.000116 0.000281 
   (0.00142) (0.00135)   (0.00141) (0.00135) 
FDI (S-N)   -0.00143 -0.00143   -0.00146 -0.00142 
   (0.00265) (0.00253)   (0.00265) (0.00253) 
FDI (N-N)   -0.00233 -0.00227   -0.00222 -0.00216 
   (0.00239) (0.00228)   (0.00239) (0.00228) 
Lnincome 0.111*** 0.109*** 0.110*** 0.108*** 0.111*** 0.109*** 0.110*** 0.108*** 
 (0.00523) (0.00571) (0.00525) (0.00574) (0.00523) (0.00571) (0.00525) (0.00572) 
Inflation  -8.68e-06  -8.63e-06  -8.70e-06  -8.70e-06 
  (6.24e-06)  (6.23e-06)  (6.24e-06)  (6.23e-06) 
Openness  -0.000414***  -0.000416***  -0.000413***  -0.000415*** 
  (3.56e-05)  (3.56e-05)  (3.56e-05)  (3.55e-05) 
Government size  0.000970  0.00100  0.000965  0.000981 
  (0.000628)  (0.000628)  (0.000628)  (0.000627) 
Government stability  0.000177***  0.000180***  0.000178***  0.000180*** 
  (2.42e-05)  (2.41e-05)  (2.42e-05)  (2.41e-05) 
         
Observations 60,855 59,215 60,855 59,215 60,855 59,215 60,855 59,215 
R-squared 0.179 0.224 0.180 0.225 0.179 0.224 0.181 0.225 
Number of group 8,275 8,061 8,275 8,061 8,275 8,061 8,275 8,061 
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
p value of F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
p value of Hansen 0.4529 0.4119 0.2447 0.3103 0.4529 0.4119 0.2447 0.3103 
Cragg-Donald F 428.217 413.139 175.819 132.456 428.217 413.139 175.819 132.456 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 







Table 1.4: Baseline Regression Results – Relative Productivity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 2-step GMM 2-step GMM 2-step GMM 2-step GMM 
FDI -0.00197 -0.00471   -0.00213 -0.00423   
 (0.00297) (0.00433)   (0.00288) (0.00417)   
FDI (S-S)   -0.00306 -0.00351   -0.00228 -0.00166 
   (0.0199) (0.0236)   (0.0198) (0.0235) 
FDI (N-S)   -0.00427 -0.00832   -0.00382 -0.00784 
   (0.00405) (0.00585)   (0.00395) (0.00554) 
FDI (S-N)   -0.00186 -0.00189   -0.00223 -0.00250 
   (0.00363) (0.00347)   (0.00355) (0.00335) 
FDI (N-N)   -0.00588 -0.00591   -0.00595 -0.00601 
   (0.00509) (0.00501)   (0.00509) (0.00500) 
Lnincome 0.0459*** 0.0572*** 0.0456*** 0.0566*** 0.0458*** 0.0573*** 0.0455*** 0.0564*** 
 (0.00830) (0.00727) (0.00837) (0.00738) (0.00829) (0.00726) (0.00836) (0.00737) 
Inflation  7.15e-05***  7.14e-05***  7.15e-05***  7.15e-05*** 
  (4.53e-06)  (4.54e-06)  (4.53e-06)  (4.54e-06) 
Openness  0.00124***  0.00124***  0.00124***  0.00124*** 
  (5.88e-05)  (5.96e-05)  (5.87e-05)  (5.95e-05) 
Government size  0.0187***  0.0188***  0.0187***  0.0188*** 
  (0.000704)  (0.000710)  (0.000703)  (0.000709) 
Credit  -0.000399***  -0.000399***  -0.000400***  -0.000399*** 
  (3.13e-05)  (3.14e-05)  (3.13e-05)  (3.14e-05) 
         
Observations 60,887 59,244 60,887 59,244 60,887 59,244 60,887 59,244 
R-squared 0.240 0.312 0.239 0.309 0.240 0.312 0.239 0.309 
Number of group 8,275 8,061 8,275 8,061 8,275 8,061 8,275 8,061 
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
p value of F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
p value of Hansen 0.8337 0.6832 0.8523 0.6394 0.8337 0.6832 0.8523 0.6394 
Cragg-Donald F 430.421 415.053 201.605 157.296 430.421 415.053 201.605 157.296 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 








Table 1.5: Robustness Check (1) – Productivity Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES FE FE FE FE FE GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM 
 FDI≥0 FDI>0 FDI>0.1 jt<617 Indicator FDI≥0 FDI>0 FDI>0.1 jt<617 Indicator 
           
FDI (S-S) 0.00859 0.00638 -0.0125 -7.84e-05 -0.0123 -0.00813 -0.00817 -0.0137 -0.0548 -0.0703 
 (0.0141) (0.0142) (0.0177) (0.0302) (0.0338) (0.0217) (0.0216) (0.0247) (0.0511) (0.0603) 
FDI (N-S) 0.000404 0.000202 7.25e-05 0.000797 0.00224 -0.00765 -0.00717 -0.00539 0.00598* -0.00486 
 (0.00140) (0.00143) (0.00154) (0.00203) (0.00167) (0.00576) (0.00546) (0.00496) (0.00312) (0.00303) 
FDI (S-N) -0.00137 -0.00115 -0.000610 -0.100 0.000605 -0.00187 -0.00166 -0.000818 -0.505** -0.00243 
 (0.00230) (0.00259) (0.00225) (0.230) (0.00230) (0.00317) (0.00342) (0.00320) (0.224) (0.00369) 
FDI (N-N) -0.00204 -0.00214 -0.00170 0.0231 -0.00201 -0.00522 -0.00569 -0.00452 0.00587 -0.00377 
 (0.00268) (0.00278) (0.00252) (0.0291) (0.00198) (0.00567) (0.00622) (0.00543) (0.0623) (0.00305) 
Lnincome 0.105*** 0.0942*** 0.114*** 0.112*** 0.125*** 0.0573*** 0.0609*** 0.0260 0.307*** -0.226*** 
 (0.00630) (0.00871) (0.0204) (0.0180) (0.00518) (0.00810) (0.00975) (0.0212) (0.0344) (0.00785) 
Inflation -7.04e-06 -7.91e-06 1.04e-05 5.30e-05*** 0.00158*** 7.29e-05*** 5.02e-05*** 7.72e-05*** 0.000110*** 0.000223 
 (6.53e-06) (6.32e-06) (2.75e-05) (1.34e-05) (0.000106) (5.16e-06) (4.32e-06) (1.88e-05) (1.56e-05) (0.000139) 
Openness -0.000433*** -0.000161*** -0.000199*** 0.000423*** 1.39e-05 0.00127*** 0.00107*** 0.000731*** -0.00236*** -0.000273*** 
 (4.12e-05) (4.87e-05) (7.49e-05) (9.48e-05) (4.04e-05) (6.68e-05) (8.39e-05) (0.000123) (0.000145) (6.14e-05) 
Govn’t size 0.00147** 0.00368*** 0.00561*** 0.00408*** -0.00547*** 0.0193*** 0.0179*** 0.0154*** 0.00862*** 0.0136*** 
 (0.000712) (0.000960) (0.00211) (0.00119) (0.000621) (0.000787) (0.000835) (0.00161) (0.00146) (0.000897) 
Credit 0.000153*** 0.000188*** 0.000213** 0.000342*** 0.000295*** -0.000452*** -5.45e-05 -4.36e-05 -0.00121*** -0.000942*** 
 (2.79e-05) (4.14e-05) (8.50e-05) (0.000116) (2.57e-05) (3.53e-05) (4.40e-05) (8.05e-05) (0.000153) (3.20e-05) 
           
Observations 51,047 25,972 7,319 8,756 47,897 51,074 25,991 7,330 8,778 47,917 
R-squared 0.217 0.153 0.115 0.047 0.070 0.310 0.296 0.257 0.340 0.289 
Number of 
group 
7,813 3,989 1,472 1,373 7,584 7,813 3,990 1,474 1,373 7,584 
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
p value of F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
p value of 
Hansen 
0.4277 0.3415 0.1720 0.1247 0.0714 0.7799 0.7967 0.5646 0.7848 0.9989 
Cragg-Donald F  143.127 72.697 18.676 15.457 165.518 143.221 72.759 18.710 20.100 150.645 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 








Table 1.6: Robustness Check (2) – Productivity Growth 





North + Emerging 
Countries 
After 1995 Drop FDI 
Outliers 
Drop Income per 
capita Outliers 




FDI (S-S) 0.0189 0.0150 -0.000333 0.0194 0.0307 -0.00797 0.0206 0.00786 
 (0.0169) (0.0154) (0.0164) (0.0213) (0.152) (0.0190) (0.0195) (0.0217) 
FDI (N-S) 0.00426 0.00414 0.00154 0.000653 -7.93e-05 0.00270 0.000304 0.00279 
 (0.00334) (0.00325) (0.00192) (0.00149) (0.00164) (0.00373) (0.00139) (0.00379) 
FDI (S-N) -0.000549 -0.000396 -0.00114 -0.00146 -0.00277 0.0337 -0.00157 0.117 
 (0.00166) (0.00144) (0.00216) (0.00258) (0.00208) (0.470) (0.00256) (0.458) 
FDI (N-N) 0.00206 0.00217 0.00297 -0.00247 -0.0192 0.0458 -0.00224 0.0355 
 (0.00357) (0.00393) (0.00443) (0.00246) (0.0276) (0.0391) (0.00228) (0.0297) 
Lnincome 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.109*** 0.104*** 0.105*** 0.188*** 0.107***  
 (0.00572) (0.00572) (0.00577) (0.00662) (0.00698) (0.00975) (0.00582)  
Inflation -8.52e-06 -8.56e-06 -8.73e-06 -0.000193*** -1.64e-05*** -0.00217*** -8.43e-06  
 (6.23e-06) (6.23e-06) (6.24e-06) (2.36e-05) (3.52e-06) (6.86e-05) (6.42e-06)  
Openness -0.000417*** -0.000416*** -0.000412*** -0.000433*** -0.000446*** -0.000289*** -0.000415***  
 (3.60e-05) (3.59e-05) (3.53e-05) (3.81e-05) (4.02e-05) (6.47e-05) (3.56e-05)  
Government size 0.000979 0.000978 0.000990 6.16e-05 0.000705 0.00169** 0.000995  
 (0.000628) (0.000628) (0.000629) (0.000710) (0.000667) (0.000687) (0.000629)  
Credit 0.000178*** 0.000178*** 0.000177*** 0.000188*** 0.000184*** 0.00138*** 0.000167***  
 (2.41e-05) (2.41e-05) (2.42e-05) (2.77e-05) (2.61e-05) (0.000291) (2.55e-05)  
Zero FDI       -0.0197**  
       (0.00765)  
Negative FDI       0.00217  
       (0.0138)  
         
Observations 59,215 59,215 59,215 55,593 55,470 25,519 59,215  
R-squared 0.224 0.225 0.226 0.225 0.223 0.389 0.219  
Number of group 8,061 8,061 8,061 8,032 7,796 3,765 8,061  
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
p value of F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
p value of Hansen 0.7859 0.7804 0.3515 0.3262 0.3532 0.7841 0.0037  
Cragg-Donald F 83.935 70.625 85.488 108.314 7.684 8.724 13.171  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 








Table 1.7: Robustness Check (3) – Productivity Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 
 No East Asia and 
Pacific 
No Europe and 
Central Asia 
No Latin America 
and the Caribbean 
No Middle East 







FDI (S-S) 0.00370 0.0191 0.0204 0.0207 0.0205 0.0210 0.0220 
 (0.0332) (0.0245) (0.0236) (0.0197) (0.0195) (0.0198) (0.0188) 
FDI (N-S) 0.000534 -0.000241 2.23e-05 0.000340 0.000362 0.000389 0.000740 
 (0.00134) (0.00128) (0.00168) (0.00136) (0.00135) (0.00135) (0.00133) 
FDI (S-N) -0.00146 -0.00135 -0.00138 -0.00150 -0.00142 -0.00145 -0.00153 
 (0.00246) (0.00231) (0.00248) (0.00256) (0.00254) (0.00253) (0.00258) 
FDI (N-N) -0.00202 -0.00193 -0.00218 -0.00231 -0.00229 -0.00226 -0.00221 
 (0.00210) (0.00195) (0.00224) (0.00232) (0.00231) (0.00228) (0.00227) 
Lnincome 0.161*** 0.0911*** 0.110*** 0.106*** 0.109*** 0.108*** 0.107*** 
 (0.00853) (0.00427) (0.00634) (0.00580) (0.00576) (0.00594) (0.00576) 
Inflation -5.62e-06 -5.95e-06*** 3.62e-06 -8.15e-06 -8.92e-06 -8.44e-06 -9.45e-06 
 (6.61e-06) (1.74e-06) (5.39e-05) (6.18e-06) (6.25e-06) (6.23e-06) (6.30e-06) 
Openness -0.000438*** -0.000549*** -0.000540*** -0.000416*** -0.000389*** -0.000419*** -0.000443*** 
 (4.46e-05) (3.37e-05) (4.03e-05) (3.59e-05) (3.59e-05) (3.58e-05) (3.36e-05) 
Government size 0.00280*** 0.00141*** -0.000232 0.000971 0.000929 0.00106* 2.80e-05 
 (0.000771) (0.000547) (0.000757) (0.000658) (0.000636) (0.000635) (0.000607) 
Credit 0.000170*** 0.000171*** 0.000203*** 0.000181*** 0.000179*** 0.000179*** 0.000198*** 
 (2.69e-05) (1.83e-05) (2.65e-05) (2.43e-05) (2.47e-05) (2.44e-05) (2.46e-05) 
        
Observations 52,184 46,483 50,903 57,851 57,817 58,712 56,323 
R-squared 0.247 0.225 0.236 0.230 0.217 0.227 0.283 
Number of group 7,229 6,185 7,048 7,833 7,851 8,001 7,569 
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
p value of F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
p value of Hansen 0.2084 0.2530 0.3131 0.3459 0.3010 0.3148 0.4671 
Cragg-Donald F 67.513 75.516 96.255 129.437 129.354 130.097 173.724 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 







Table 1.8: Robustness Check (4) – Relative Productivity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 2-step GMM 2-step GMM 2-step GMM 2-step GMM 












         
FDI (S-S) 0.00104 -0.000203 0.000327 0.000777 0.00301 0.00176 0.00227 0.00277 
 (0.0220) (0.0225) (0.0224) (0.0221) (0.0220) (0.0225) (0.0224) (0.0220) 
FDI (N-S) -0.00813 -0.00816 -0.00814 -0.00814 -0.00768 -0.00770 -0.00768 -0.00768 
 (0.00570) (0.00574) (0.00572) (0.00571) (0.00539) (0.00543) (0.00541) (0.00540) 
FDI (S-N) -0.00186 -0.00183 -0.00183 -0.00186 -0.00243 -0.00241 -0.00241 -0.00242 
 (0.00354) (0.00349) (0.00349) (0.00353) (0.00344) (0.00337) (0.00338) (0.00343) 
FDI (N-N) -0.00592 -0.00591 -0.00592 -0.00591 -0.00606 -0.00604 -0.00606 -0.00606 
 (0.00498) (0.00498) (0.00499) (0.00497) (0.00496) (0.00497) (0.00498) (0.00496) 
Lnincome 0.0991*** 0.0856*** 0.0874*** 0.0981*** 0.0988*** 0.0853*** 0.0871*** 0.0978*** 
 (0.00701) (0.00713) (0.00711) (0.00702) (0.00700) (0.00712) (0.00710) (0.00702) 
Inflation 7.65e-05*** 7.47e-05*** 7.53e-05*** 7.61e-05*** 7.65e-05*** 7.48e-05*** 7.53e-05*** 7.61e-05*** 
 (4.21e-06) (4.30e-06) (4.28e-06) (4.22e-06) (4.21e-06) (4.30e-06) (4.28e-06) (4.22e-06) 
Openness 0.00117*** 0.00118*** 0.00118*** 0.00116*** 0.00117*** 0.00118*** 0.00118*** 0.00116*** 
 (5.84e-05) (5.87e-05) (5.86e-05) (5.85e-05) (5.84e-05) (5.87e-05) (5.86e-05) (5.84e-05) 
Government size 0.0180*** 0.0183*** 0.0182*** 0.0181*** 0.0180*** 0.0183*** 0.0182*** 0.0181*** 
 (0.000684) (0.000693) (0.000692) (0.000685) (0.000683) (0.000692) (0.000691) (0.000684) 
Credit -0.000393*** -0.000393*** -0.000389*** -0.000397*** -0.000393*** -0.000393*** -0.000389*** -0.000397*** 
 (3.05e-05) (3.07e-05) (3.07e-05) (3.05e-05) (3.05e-05) (3.07e-05) (3.07e-05) (3.05e-05) 
         
Observations 59,244 59,244 59,244 59,244 59,244 59,244 59,244 59,244 
R-squared 0.278 0.380 0.368 0.295 0.278 0.380 0.368 0.295 
Number of group 8,061 8,061 8,061 8,061 8,061 8,061 8,061 8,061 
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
p value of F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
p value of Hansen 0.4821 0.5290 0.5144 0.4898 0.4821 0.5290 0.5144 0.4898 
Cragg-Donald F 157.296 157.296 157.296 157.296 157.296 157.296 157.296 157.296 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 







Table 1.9: Decomposition – Bilateral FDI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Fixed Effects 2-step GMM Fixed Effects 2-step GMM Fixed Effects 2-step GMM Fixed Effects 2-step GMM 
 Physical Capital Growth Human Capital Growth 
         
FDI -0.00176 -0.00177   2.11e-05** 2.12e-05**   
 (0.00131) (0.00128)   (9.10e-06) (9.06e-06)   
FDI (S-S)   -0.0353 -0.0330   0.00226** 0.00222** 
   (0.0331) (0.0329)   (0.00110) (0.00108) 
FDI (N-S)   -0.00744 -0.00846   -1.86e-05 -1.88e-05 
   (0.00786) (0.00783)   (0.000101) (0.000101) 
FDI (S-N)   -0.00171 -0.00147   -2.58e-05 -1.39e-05 
   (0.00683) (0.00663)   (6.95e-05) (6.91e-05) 
FDI (N-N)   0.00258 0.00138   5.94e-06 4.17e-06 
   (0.00279) (0.00274)   (6.64e-05) (6.64e-05) 
Lnincome -0.339*** -0.339*** -0.352*** -0.349*** -0.00156** -0.00156** -0.00261*** -0.00261*** 
 (0.103) (0.0985) (0.0407) (0.0398) (0.000768) (0.000768) (0.000256) (0.000256) 
Inflation -4.93e-05 -4.93e-05 2.78e-05 2.80e-05 7.20e-07 7.22e-07 1.86e-07 1.85e-07 
 (5.31e-05) (5.30e-05) (1.70e-05) (1.70e-05) (5.02e-07) (5.02e-07) (1.82e-07) (1.82e-07) 
Openness 0.000733 0.000737 0.001000*** 0.000977*** -3.08e-05*** -3.08e-05*** -3.22e-05*** -3.21e-05*** 
 (0.000728) (0.000705) (0.000210) (0.000205) (7.52e-06) (7.52e-06) (2.07e-06) (2.07e-06) 
Government size -0.00583 -0.00589 -0.00423 -0.00394 0.000178*** 0.000178*** 0.000279*** 0.000279*** 
 (0.00943) (0.00907) (0.00353) (0.00347) (4.62e-05) (4.62e-05) (1.52e-05) (1.51e-05) 
Credit 0.000963 0.000974 -0.000329 -0.000345* 1.06e-06 1.05e-06 1.80e-05*** 1.80e-05*** 
 (0.00154) (0.00145) (0.000210) (0.000204) (4.44e-06) (4.44e-06) (8.20e-07) (8.19e-07) 
         
Observations 2,305 2,305 71,638 71,638 2,138 2,138 63,650 63,650 
R-squared 0.023 0.023 0.074 0.074 0.199 0.199 0.292 0.293 
Number of group 144 144   130 130   
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
p value of F statistic 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
p value of Hansen 0.9833 0.9833 0.0849 0.0849 0.8952 0.8952 0.4238 0.4238 
Cragg-Donald F 567.385 567.385 105.516 105.516 474.325 474.325 157.943 157.943 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Chapter 2: Target at the Right Level: Aid, Spillovers and Growth in 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
2.1. Introduction 
Previous literature has focused substantially on the effectiveness of foreign aid. Is aid 
effective in reducing poverty and promoting economic growth in recipient regions 
(Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Collier and Dollar, 2002; Easterly, 
2003; Hansen and Tarp, 2004; Rajan and Subramanian, 2008)? The answer to this 
question has very important policy implications and could affect donors as well as other 
international community to make future decisions of aid allocations. This topic has been 
under hot debates during the past few years. However, the various conclusions hardly 
make a consensus. 
 Due to data limitations, most of the early studies pay attention to the 
effectiveness of aid inflows to the recipient country’s overall economic growth rate. But 
we should not expect all the aid has been allocated across the entire country evenly. For 
example, if aid was going to a very small locality, a moderate amount of aid flow would 
only stimulate local economic activity instead of the entire country’s growth. Perhaps 
the “aggregation bias” is one reason why most of the literature cannot get consensus of 
the impact of aid on the economic growth of the recipient countries. Another under-
studied issue is that aid going to one place may also affect its neighbors through various 
channels – the spillover effects. For example, one region might benefit not only from 
the aid flowing in that place directly, but also from the aid flowing to its neighbors 
through various channels such as resource movements and technology dissemination. 
Aid flows attract or distract resources movements across different places, which could 
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affect economic performance outside the recipient location. Thus, ignoring potential 
spillover effects might lead to overestimating or underestimating the true effectiveness 
of aid. 
 This article contributes to the literature by exploring aid effectiveness and aid 
spillovers at the sub-national level in Sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa is the 
home to most of the least developed countries (LDCs) with an urgent need for economic 
growth and development. As a typical aid-receiving region, Sub-Saharan Africa 
receives tremendous amount of aid every year. The United Nations Millennium Goals 
aims “to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger” as one of its top targets. As such, a 
large amount of assistance has been transferred to this region in recent years. For 
example, some ambitious individuals and organizations have built various projects 
across this continent, which attracts many positive comments as well as doubts. One 
famous program is the Millennium Villages Project launched by Jeffrey Sachs and his 
colleagues. They claim that the project has achieved several important goals, such as 
decreasing disease prevalence, promoting agricultural production and increasing family 
income (Sanchez et al., 2007). However, Munk (2013) doubts the project could end 
poverty and calls Jeffrey “the idealist”. Using country GDP data to evaluate the 
effectiveness of this project is not only inappropriate but also misleading since its 
programs are scattered around a couple of separate villages across different countries. 
Local aid effectiveness cannot be explained by country-level evaluation and should be 
taken care of once we focus on sub-national economic activities.  
 Unlike cross-country studies which typically assume country independence 
across borders, regions within one country should have more active interactions with 
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each other because barriers within one country are generally much lower than across 
countries. Therefore, it is necessary to take into account the possibility of more 
intensive interactions when focusing on sub-national economic activities. Economic 
activities in one region tend to affect other regions as well. As a result, spillovers play a 
very important role in sub-national aid effectiveness. This article assumes that: (1) there 
exist aid spillover effects within a country, but once moving across the country borders, 
spillover effects vanish; (2) spillovers only exist across adjacent neighbors, and would 
vanish beyond that. I make the above assumptions for the following reasons: (1) aid 
could create new incentives to attract resource movements from one place to another, 
but once touching the country boundary, the movements are blocked; (2) most of the aid 
projects targeted at local level are very specifically located, thus I expect resource 
movements to take place only in short distances and only the adjacent neighbors are 
affected. These simplifying assumptions can retain the essential interests being explored 
and reduce the computational burden in this article. 
 By using a geocoded aid project dataset and night lights data as proxy for 
economic activities, I am able to focus on local aid effectiveness induced by aid 
received at different aggregate levels in Sub-Saharan Africa. I use the second order 
administrative division (ADM2, such as district, equivalent to U.S. county) as the 
primary unit of analysis. I also apply geographic information systems (GIS) methods to 
establish adjacent neighbor weights matrices among ADM2s to capture the potential 
spillover effects. To deal with the classical simultaneity problem between aid and 
growth, I use adjusted aid series by two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach. 
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By using rigorous regressions and tests, I find that: (1) aid targeted at ADM2 
level tends to promote local economic growth while aid received at more aggregate 
levels is negatively related with local economic activity; (2) there exists positive aid 
spillovers across local adjacent neighbors. The results are robust to a variety of 
sensitivity tests. I also explore several extension topics relevant to aid literature and find 
that: (1) aid at the local level promotes total economic flourish and slows down 
population growth, while aid at more aggregate levels depresses total economic 
activities but stimulates population growth; (2) there exist diminishing returns to direct 
aid, but aid from neighbors exhibits weak increasing returns possibly through 
technology and knowledge spillovers; (3) there is no robust evidence showing aid 
effectiveness is conditional on policy or institutions, and one possible reason is data 
limitations – policy and institutions are measured at country level instead of sub-
national level. 
These findings have very important policy implications. First, more specifically 
targeted aid tends to be more effective to promote local economic growth, while highly 
likely fungible aid at more aggregate levels would do the opposite; as a result, if we 
would like to stimulate local economic activities, we should focus on specific aid 
projects instead of aid given to governments at a more aggregate level. Second, we 
should reduce barriers to resource movement and knowledge dissemination within the 
country to promote positive spillover effects. 
 This article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the recent literature. 
Section 3 presents the model and discusses estimation methodology. Section 4 describes 
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the data. Section 5 displays regression results. Section 6 shows robustness checks and 
makes extensions. Section 7 concludes and gives policy implications. 
2.2. Literature Review 
There has been an enormous growth in literature focusing on aid effectiveness since the 
seminal research launched by Boone (1996), who found that aid does not affect 
investment but increases government sizes. Following his research, a large number of 
paper also derived similar conclusions, showing that aid is rarely conducive to growth. 
Easterly (2003) doubts aid effectiveness argued by Burnside and Dollar (2000). 
Roodman (2007) argues the previous conclusions of positive association between aid 
and growth is not robust. In a later article (Roodman, 2015), he argues that Clemens et 
al. (2012) fail to remove contemporaneous endogeneity and once this issue is addressed, 
no evidence shows aid supports growth. Rajan and Subramanian (2008) show little 
evidence of aid effectiveness, either positive or negative. Doucouliagos and Paldam 
(2009) summarize the aid literature in the past 40 years and they find little evidence 
showing aid is effective.  
 However, quite a few articles find the opposite. Dalgaard et al. (2004) find 
overall positive relationship between aid and growth. Clemens et al. (2012) based on 
previously published articles, find increasing aid could stimulate investment and 
growth. Askarov and Doucouliagos (2015b) investigate aid and growth in transitional 
countries and find that aid has an average positive impact on growth in these countries. 
  
One possible reason for the mixed conclusions reached by the previous literature 
is that they suffer from the so-called “aggregation bias”. Aid projects may have been 
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scattered around different places in a given country. Sometimes, summing up the total 
amount of aid and investigating the aggregate impact on a country’s economic growth is 
meaningless and cannot provide any useful implications. Unfortunately, there is little 
work done exploring aid effectiveness within one country. Dreher and Lohmann (2015) 
is one among the rare articles which examine aid effectiveness at sub-national level. 
They use a previous version of the geocoded aid data and find that positive correlation 
exists between aid and growth at the local level in 130 countries over 2000-2011. 
However, they fail to solve the potential simultaneity problem and thus could not make 
any causal argument that aid causes growth. Additionally, finding appropriate 
instruments for aid is notoriously hard, as pointed out in the literature. In Section 3, 
based on my model specification, I explain further details about the previously used 
instruments and how I follow a novel procedure, which was recently proposed by 
Brückner (2013). 
 What is more, at the sub-national level, individuals are supposed to have more 
economic interactions than at country level, since barriers to resource movements and 
knowledge dissemination are much lower at the sub-national level than at the country 
level. However, most of the literature ignores this issue. To the best of my knowledge, 
Askarov and Doucouliagos (2015a) is the only article that discusses aid spillovers. They 
analyze aid spillovers across transitional countries and find that positive net spillovers 
exist through increased technology levels and currency appreciation. To capture the 
possibility of more intensive interactions between individuals, talking about spillovers 
analysis at the sub-national level are necessary and needed. As far as I know, my 
research is the first to examine aid spillovers at the sub-national level. 
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 My article is also related with the literature on conditional effectiveness of aid, 
that is, aid effectiveness conditional on a third variable. This topic has been in hot 
discussions in recent years and various conclusions have been attended. Based on 
current publications and debates, policy index is among the most popular conditional 
variables. Burnside and Dollar (2000) in a seminal article show that good policies 
stimulate the positive relationship between aid and growth, otherwise little effect is 
found. Collier and Dollar (2002) analyze the aid allocation patterns and conclude that 
the impact of aid on the poverty reduction depends on poverty level and policy 
qualities. There are also other conditional variables under way. Easterly (2003) and 
Chong et al. (2009) find little evidence that aid increases economic growth when good 
institutions are observed. Dalgaard et al. (2004) argue that aid is less effective in 
tropical countries, suggesting that climate and geographic factors may also play a role in 
aid effectiveness. Lessmann and Markwardt (2012) find aid tends to be more effective 
in more fiscal centralized countries. My benchmark work mainly focuses on 
unconditional aid effectiveness, but further explorations about conditional effectiveness 
of aid are also discussed in Section 6. 
 My research is also relevant to the literature focusing on non-linear aid 
effectiveness and diminishing returns to aid. If aid affects growth through investment 
and capital accumulation, based on the neo-classical theory, we should observe that aid 
stimulates growth, but the marginal contribution falls as the amount of aid rises. 
Burnside and Dollar (2000), Lensink and White (2001), and Collier and Dollar (2002) 
all find evidence that diminishing returns to aid exists and aid effectiveness depends on 
the amount of aid received. However, no literature discusses the non-linear 
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effectiveness of aid spillovers. If aid has spillover effects, since the spillovers do not 
directly increase the capital accumulation of recipient’s neighbors, aid spillovers should 
behave very differently from diminishing returns. I will discuss this issue in Section 6. 
2.3. Model Specification 
The main focus of this article is to investigate aid effectiveness and aid spillovers at the 
sub-national level. Therefore, based on the previous aid and growth literature, I adopt 
the main regression function as follows: 
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ∗ ln(1 + 𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑖−1,𝑡) + 𝛽1 ∗ ln (1 + 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀2) + 𝛽2 ∗ ln (1 +
𝑎𝑖𝑑−𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀2 ) + 𝛽3 ∗ ln (1 + 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀1) + 𝛽4 ∗ ln (1 + 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
) + 𝛾′𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 +
𝑖,𝑡      (1) 
where 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡  is the growth rate of income per capita in ADM2 i at t. Following 
previous literature (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Clemens et 
al., 2012), I use four-year averages in this model to smooth business cycle fluctuations. 
ln(1 + 𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑖−1,𝑡) represents the logarithm of lagged income per capita level in 
ADM2 i. If the convergence growth story applies to sub-Saharan Africa, we should 
expect 𝛼1<0, which means faster growth should be observed in poorer regions. 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀2 
is the total amount of aid received by ADM2 i at t-1, while 𝑎𝑖𝑑−𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀2  is the total amount 
of aid received by i’s neighbors18. 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀1 is the fair share (total amount divided by the 
number of ADM2s) of total amount of aid received by the ADM1 where ADM2 i 
locates at t-1, excluding the amount of aid received at ADM2 level19. 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
 is the 
fair share of total amount of aid received by the country where ADM2 i locates at t-1, 
                                                 
18 Both of the two variables contain aid with precision levels 1-3, see appendix for further discussions. 
19 Aid with precision level 4, see appendix for further discussions. 
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excluding the amount of aid received at ADM2 and ADM1 levels20. In other words, 
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀1 measures the net part of average aid share at more aggregate level at ADM1 
level, and 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦





 ) are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. 𝛿𝑖 and 𝛿𝑡 
are fixed effects capturing ADM2-specific and time-invariant parts. 
 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 is a matrix of lagged control variables. Due to data limitation, the conflict 
intensity is the only variable that varies at ADM2 level, and all other control variables 
are measured at the country level: 
 General government final consumption expenditure, is measured by government 
expenditure as a share of GDP. According to the neo-classical theory, an increase in 
government expenditure could increase income through multiplier process. However, if 
a jump in government spending leads to a rise in interest rate, government expenditure 
could “crowd out” private investment. Lin (1994) finds government expenditure is 
positively associated with growth in the short-run but not in the medium-run. Devarajan 
et al. (1996) find a negative relationship between government expenditure and 
economic growth, as a result of potential resource misallocation. The impact of 
government expenditure on economic growth is, therefore, an empirical question. 
 Inflation rate, measured by the percentage change in GDP deflator, theoretically 
is expected to have positive impact on growth if it is mild and hurt economic growth 
when there is hyperinflation (Bruno and William, 1998). The findings of Khan and 
Abdelhak (2011) are consistent with the above theory: they find that inflation is 
negatively related with growth when inflation rate is above a threshold level: 1-3 
                                                 
20 Aid with precision levels 5-8, see appendix for further discussions. 
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percentage points for developed countries and 11-12 percentage points for developing 
countries. Table 2 shows the average inflation rate over 4-year period is 11.109%, 
touching the threshold set by the Khan and Abdelhak (2011).  Therefore, I expect 
inflation has a negative impact on growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 Openness to trade is the ratio of sum of imports and exports to GDP in one 
country. Based on the new growth theory, international trade can improve technology 
and institutions, which increases economic growth. Harrison (1996) finds that there 
exists a positive association between openness and growth in developing countries. 
Edwards (1998) shows that more open countries tend to have faster total factor 
productivity growth. As a result, positive impact of openness on economic growth is 
expected in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 ICRG composite score measures the institutional development level of a 
country, calculated as the sum of the risk scores in 12 subcategories, including 
government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, 
external conflict, corruption, military in politics, religious tensions, law and order, 
ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, and bureaucracy quality. The composite 
scores range from 0 to 100, with higher scores representing better institutions. 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) find that better institutions tend to increase economic growth. 
 Conflict intensity, measured as the continuous intensity of conflict incidence 
across Africa continent, is the only control variable at sub-national level in equation (1). 
Since conflict tends to interrupt economic transaction and law of order, I expect higher 
conflict intensity is associated with lower economic growth. 
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 This article focuses on aid effectiveness and aid spillovers at sub-national level, 
the major variables of interest are 𝛽1, 𝛽2 , 𝛽3 and 𝛽4. However, the effect might also 
work in the other direction that is from growth to aid. If countries with faster growth 
systematically receive more or less aid, the simultaneity and reverse causality problem 
will lead to biased estimators even in a large sample. For example, donors may use aid 
as a reward for countries which have good economic performance, or allocate more aid 
to more struggling countries to alleviate poverty. Since aid in the previous period can be 
perceived as predetermined in current period, lagging aid variables by one period can 
help alleviate the simultaneity problem. However, if serial correlation exists, aid in one 
period would be correlated with aid in the next period, with the latter potentially 
correlated with current economic growth. Chong, et al. (2009) address the simultaneity 
in the aid-growth regressions and suggest using instrumentation to solve the problem. 
Therefore, we need to find good instruments for aid, which should be correlated with 
aid variables conditional on other exogenous variables, but uncorrelated with the error 
term in the original aid-growth regression.  
However, as the previous studies show, finding instruments for aid is 
notoriously hard. Boone (1994), and Burnside and Dollar (2000) use population sizes in 
recipient countries as instruments for aid. But Clemens et al. (2012) show that heavily 
depending on population size induces weak instrument problem, which indicates 
population size cannot explain much variation in aid after controlling other exogenous 
variables. Rajan and Subramanian (2008), and Lessmann and Markwardt (2012) use the 
relationship between donors and recipients, such as historic relationship, political allies 
and common languages. The limitation of using relationship variables in this article is 
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that most of the time these variables are defined at the country level. Therefore, they 
cannot capture aid variation when focusing on sub-national regions.  Hansen and Tarp 
(2001), Lessmann and Markwardt (2012), Angeles and Neanidis (2009), and Askarov 
and Doucouliagos (2015) apply further lagged aid variables such as aid at t-2 or t-3 to 
build exclusion restriction, but potential serial correlation imposes doubts on the 
validity of this type of instruments, as mentioned previously. If lagged aid variables are 
somehow correlated with lagged growth rate (very likely), while growth variable 
behaves serial correlation, lagged aid variables are invalid to serve as instruments for 
current growth. 
Brückner (2013) argues that large negative causal effect from growth to aid 
should be accounted for to estimate aid effectiveness on growth. He provides a novel 
way of building instrumentation and isolating the exogenous part of aid in the aid-
growth circle. In the first step, he runs a regression of aid on growth, using rainfall and 
international commodity price as instruments for growth. Next, he removes the 
endogenous part of the aid based on the estimated regression coefficients. Then, he uses 
the “uncontaminated” aid as the instruments for aid-growth regression. 
Following his procedure, first I regress aid on growth to capture the potential 
effects of growth on aid: 
ln(1 + 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑡−1) = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑡 + 𝑐 ∗ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡      (2) 
where ln(1 + 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑡−1) is the general form of logged level of aid received at t-1, and 
includes 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀2 ,  𝑎𝑖𝑑−𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀2 , 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀1 , and 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
; 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡  is the growth of 
income per capita in i at t. 𝑎𝑖 and 𝑏𝑡 are ADM2 fixed effects and time fixed effects. I 
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use air temperature and precipitation21 in region i at time t as instruments for 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡, 
since African economy is heavily based on agriculture and these weather conditions are 
assumed to affect agricultural output contemporaneously. The exclusion restriction is 
that current weather conditions should not affect any lagged aid flows. 
 After capturing the potential endogeneity by c, I measure the adjusted logged aid 
series as follows: 
ln(1 + 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑡−1
∗ ) = ln(1 + 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑡−1) − 𝑐 ∗ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡      (3) 
This adjusted aid series is assumed to be exogenous to 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡  and is used as 
instruments for ln(1 + 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑡−1)  in equation (1). Brückner (2013) shows the above 
process generates consistent estimates of the coefficients of aid variables in equation (1) 
when simultaneity problem is present. 
2.4. Data Description 
Table 1 lists the data sources for the main variables used in regressions. The geocoded 
aid data are from the World Bank Geocoded Research Release, Level 1, Version 1.3 
database complied by AidData (Tierney et al., 2011), which covers 5,881 projects 
(5,684 geocoded projects) with 61,243 locations (one project can have multiple 
locations) around the world over the period 1995-2014.  Each aid project is attached 
with geographic longitude and latitude as well as precision level22. The amount of aid 
disbursement in terms of current US dollars for each aid project is also depicted in the 
database. 
 Figures 1-3 show pictures of aid projects allocations across Sub-Saharan Africa 
at different administrative levels. 
                                                 
21 The original instrument international commodity price used in Brückner (2013) is not available at the 
sub-national level in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
22 See appendix for details. 
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 It is a well-known problem that the quality of national accounting data in Africa 
is low and unreliable. Jerven (2013) in his book illustrates in detail about the poor 
national accounting statistics in Africa, and how little we know about Africa based on 
these poor numbers. What is more, GDP or income data at sub-national level in Africa 
have been barely reported. As a result, I need to use reliable proxy for local economic 
activities. Recent work has already pointed out that the night lights data can be used to 
measure economic activity (Elvidge et al., 2001; Elvidge et al., 2009; Sutton and 
Costanza, 2002). Henderson et al. (2012) in their seminal paper use night lights data to 
adjust income data in major developing countries, and they find positive elasticity of 
GDP with respect to lights. Therefore, in this article, I use night lights as my proxy for 
local income. The night lights data (1992-2013) are observed from satellites of the 
United States Air Force Defense’s Meteorological Satellite Program, which move 
around the circle out of the earth for 14 times a day. The night lights data cover the 
intensity of the nights on earth between 65 degree South and 75 degree North, which 
includes most of the area for human economic activities. The night lights data are 
depicted as small pixels across the whole world with different lights intensities (from 0 
to 63, with 63 the biggest intensity). 
 Geocoded worldwide population data are from CIESIN and CIAT. Like night 
lights, population data are also depicted as pixels, with each pixel attached with the 
population counts falling in that pixel. The continuous data make population 
measurement at sub-national level possible. This dataset is based on national census 
survey so the data are only available every five years (1990, 1995 and 2000). They also 
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made the estimated data in years 2005, 2010 and 2015. For the rest of the years, I use 
linear interpolation to get the projected population to fill the gaps. 
 Administrative boundaries are from the Global Administrative Areas Database, 
which provides administrative boundaries at different administrative levels in each 
country. Each administrative unit is depicted as a polygon, with descriptive information 
about that unit being attached. 
 The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) (1997-2015) and 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) (1987-2012) provide geocoded conflicts data, 
with each conflict incidence displayed as a single point on the map. Since one conflict 
incidence is not likely to be confined on one single point, based on the incidence 
locations, I build continuous conflict kernel density weighted by fatalities across the 
African continent. 
 Air temperature and precipitation monthly data (1900-2014) are from the 
website of Center for Climatic Research, Department of Geography, University of 
Delaware. Like the night lights and population data, both of the weather conditions are 
depicted as continuous pixel data across the world for the past century. The pixel data 
capture variation in weather conditions within one country. I take the year average to 
get annual data series. 
 Government expenditure, inflation, money supply, openness and fiscal surplus 
are from World Development Indicators of the World Bank. All of the above variables 
are only available at country level. ICRG composite score is the sum of the ICRG 
institutional scores in all the subcategories, also measured at country level. Table 1 lists 
the data sources for major variables. 
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Table 2 provides the summary statistics of the data. A typical region gets 
220,932.9 US dollars annually at ADM2 level, and is expected to receive 81,441.43 
dollars and 7,071.052 dollars from ADM1 and country levels. The mean of aid its 
weighted neighbor receives at ADM2 level is 228,552 dollars. The annual growth rate 
of income per capita each year in a typical ADM2 is only 0.042% on average. 
GIS appendix discusses the description and processing procedures of spatial data 
in more details. 
2.5. Regression Results 
Table 3 shows regression results for Equation (2). In the first stage, I use air 
temperature and precipitation as instruments for economic growth, as displayed in 
Column (1). Both air temperature and precipitation have statistical significance, and 






 as dependent variables, respectively, to 
estimate parameter 𝑐 in Equation (2) for simultaneity effects from growth to aid. The 
instruments for growth in the first stage pass over-identification test in all the columns. 
 Table 4 shows the regression results for Equation (1). In Column (1), only 
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀2 is included in the regression. The coefficient of aid received by this ADM2 is 
positive and significant at 1% level, indicating aid has positive impact on economic 
growth at ADM2 level. A 1% increase in lagged aid tends to increase economic growth 
by 0.979%, which means doubling the aid amount is likely to almost double the growth 
rate. Lagged income level has negative and significant influence on current growth rate, 
which is consistent with growth convergence theory: less advanced regions tend to have 
faster economic growth on average. Government expenditure is negatively associated 
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with economic growth, which indicates there exist potential “crowding out” effects at 
ADM2 level. Inflation tends to increase transaction costs and harm local economic 
activities and hence acts as an obstacle to economic growth. ADM2s in countries with 
higher degrees of openness also enjoy more benefits from international transactions, 
which are conducive to their growth. Conflict intensity is unexpectedly positively 
related with economic activities, but does not have significant effect after controlling 
for other variables, which might be the result of multicollinearity among control 
variables. We should keep in mind that all the control variables except for conflict 
intensity are measured at country level due to data limitation and thus the coefficients of 
these characteristic variables are only indicative, not definitive. Both the Cragg-Donald 
Wald F statistic and Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic are far greater than the critical 
values calculated by Stock and Yogo (2005), indicating the instruments have good 
power to explain the endogenous aid variables. 
 In Column (2), I add weighted aid received by adjacent neighbors to capture the 
potential spillover effects of aid at ADM2 level. The coefficient of aid from this ADM2 
is still positive and significant, with the magnitude only slightly reduced. Aid received 
by the neighbors of i also has positive and significant impact on region i’s economic 
growth. The magnitude of spillovers to ADM2 i is almost half of the direct effects of 
aid received by i. Thus, ignoring the potential spillover effects of aid can lead to 
underestimation of the aid effectiveness at local level by almost a third, since the direct 
aid amount is almost equal to the weighted aid amount from neighbors on average. 
 Askarov and Doucouliagos (2015a) investigate aid spillovers in transitional 
economics. They find that aid has positive impact on the growth of recipients but has 
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negative net spillovers on other countries. The channels for negative aid spillovers, they 
analyze, are emigration of skilled workers and development of institutional 
environment. Also, they give some explanations for potential positive spillovers: 
currency appreciation in recipient country could increase imports from nearby 
countries; established expertise and technical assistant programs could promote total 
factor productivity and knowledge spillovers to other regions. Since my model captures 
the spillover effects within one country, the seemingly sensible explanation for the case 
in this article is improved total factor productivity and knowledge dissemination. 
However, it is still possible that income effect matters here: aid promotes economic 
growth and income in recipient regions, and residents in these recipient regions 
purchase more goods and services from nearby regions, generating positive spillovers to 
the neighbors. 
 Only 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀1 is included in Column (3), which captures the effectiveness of the 
fair share of aid received at more aggregate level (aid received at ADM1 level divided 
by the number of ADM2s in that ADM1, after excluding aid directly targeted at ADM2 
level). Aid received at ADM1 level is negatively associated with economic growth in 
ADM2 i, which means aid targeted at a more aggregate level tends to harm local 
economic activities. Trade openness and ICRG score switch signs, probably due to 
potential multicollinearity of these control variables and aid at more aggregate levels.  
Based on Column (3), Column (4) adds aid at ADM2 level back. The regression 
results still shows aid at ADM2 level tends to promote local growth while aid received 
at more aggregate level is likely to harm growth in ADM2 i. The magnitude of aid 
effectiveness at ADM2 level shrinks by about 20% while the negative impact of aid at 
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ADM1 level increases by roughly 30%. After including local aid, openness to trade 
regains positive conditional marginal effects on growth. 
In Column (5), 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
 is the only included aid variable, which measures the 
effectiveness of fair share of aid at country level (aid targeted at country level divided 
by the number of ADM2s in that country, after excluding aid targeted at ADM2 and 
ADM1 levels). Similar to the result in Column (3), the coefficient in Column (5) also 
shows negative effects of aid on growth.  
Column (6) includes all the aid variables in the regression and is my benchmark 
specification. The coefficient of aid at ADM2 and ADM1 levels still retains the same 
signs and significance, only with the magnitude slightly reduced. The effectiveness of 
aid at country level gets the impact cut by almost two thirds, but it is still negative and 
statistically significant. The regression results indicate that aid targeted at local level 
tends to promote local growth, while aid targeted at more aggregate levels is likely to 
hurt local economic growth. For a region with an average amount of aid inflows, the 
total aid effectiveness on growth at all levels is positive but statistically insignificant23. 
The finding of insignificant total effects is consistent with Rajan and Subramanian 
(2008), who find little robust aid effectiveness using cross-country data. However, their 
research is subject to aggregation bias and does not reveal detailed patterns at different 
levels. 
The previous literature provides some insights on my findings. Van de Walle 
and Mu (2007) investigate the impact of aid on road project in Vietnam and they find 
that most of the aid allocated stuck to the road sector and no evidence shows that aid 
                                                 
23 The p-value is 0.822. 
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was appropriated for other sectoral constructions. On contrary, Boone (1996) finds aid 
generally increases the size of the government without promoting investment or human 
development indicators at the country level. More specifically targeted aid tends to be 
less fungible compared to “general” aid, since a specific project can make detailed plans 
and track the expenditure without much effort. While aid generally given to a more 
aggregated level such as ADM1 or country is more likely to be misappropriated for 
other purposes. What is more, Svensson (2000) shows that foreign aid provides rent-
seeking opportunities and is associated with higher corruption. Asongu (2012) also 
finds evidence that aid promotes corruption in Africa. Easily fungible aid tends to fuel 
corruption and hurt institutional environment at more aggregate levels, and perhaps that 
is why we observe negative aid impacts at both ADM1 and country levels. Another 
conjecture is that locally targeted aid may stimulate participation of local community, 
who are usually supposed to have better knowledge about local conditions (Feeney, 
1998). Also, this case is one example justifying Easterly’s argument that “bottom-up” 
approach may work better than “top-down” approach in some development policy 
designs (Easterly, 2008). 
Based on Column (6), Column (7) uses OLS approach for the same regression. 
The coefficients of aid variables at ADM2 levels reverse signs and become both 
statistically and economically insignificant. The marginal effects of aid at ADM1 and 
country levels still preserve statistical significance, but their marginal effects drop 
substantially. Since OLS cannot solve the potential simultaneity problem, the results 
displayed in Column (7) are potentially biased even in large sample. The comparison 
between Columns (6) and (7) illustrates that failing to deal with simultaneity problem in 
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aid-growth regressions can lead to very biased results. Failing to remove the potential 
negative causal impact of growth on aid is one possible reason why previous literature 
finds conflicting conclusions about aid effectiveness. 
2.6. Robustness and Further Exploration 
2.6.1. Robustness Check 
Several tests are applied in this section to check the robustness of the baseline results 
(Table 3, Column (6)). In Column 1 of Table 5, considering that some regions might 
have unstable growth from satellites observations and remote sensing processing, I 
exclude observations with growth rates below 1st percentile or above 99th percentiles. 
The coefficients of aid variables shrink substantially to about 20% of the original levels, 
but still keep the same signs and statistical significance. This exercise suggests that 
much of the variation is driven by the so-called “outliers”. However, without further 
information, I cannot tell whether that is the result of data noise or aid is especially 
effective in these regions. 
 About 10% of the observations see zero night lights per capita, probably there 
existed less than enough economic activities to have the lights to be detected by the 
satellites. Worried by the potential underestimation of the aid effectiveness resulting 
from undetectability, I exclude all the observations with zero night lights per capita 
level, which account for about 10% observations. Column 2 displays the new results: all 
the aid variables have almost the same coefficients as in the baseline regression. The 
zero income level is not a big concern to affect the aforementioned conclusions. 
 Contrary to the undetectability problem, sometimes accidents or other 
incidences would cause abnormally high detected lights. For example, gas flares, which 
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are often observed in the petroleum production field, tend to produce unusually highly 
intensified lights although little economic activity is underway. Another possibility is 
the forest fires, which produce lots of lights but are barely qualified to serve as proxy 
for human economic activities. Columns (3) and (4) keep observations with night lights 
per capita level less than 95th percentile and 99th percentile, respectively. The 
magnitudes of coefficients get reduced by 40% and 80% for each case. The underlying 
indication is that observations with top 5% income levels tend to capture a lot of 
variations in lights and when excluded, aid effectiveness falls. 
 Some regions may have received disproportionate aid compared to other 
regions. They are, in terms of aid amount received, aid outliers. In the last two columns, 
I exclude observations with aid greater than 99th percentile and 95th percentile. The 
results barely impose any suspects on my baseline regression results. 
 The main purpose of taking 4-year averages is to smooth the economic 
fluctuation and business cycle. However, we need to be aware that how many 
observations have been using to construct the average in each 4-year period. If in one 4-
year period, there are too few observations to make the average (such as only 1 
observation in one 4-year window), then the calculated average tends to be further away 
from the mean and the fluctuation of the sampling distribution gets increased. 
Therefore, the results are likely to be biased. In Table 6 Column (1), I only include the 
4-year window with no less than 2 observations to make the average. The number of 
observations drops by a half and the coefficient estimates are doubled. Neither the signs 
nor statistical significance is changed. Column (2) retains these 4-year windows with no 
less than 3 observations and the conclusions are retained. 
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 The means of aid variables see a jump from the first period (1995-1998) to the 
second period (1999-2002)24. One possible reason is there exist potential missing values 
in the first period which are not counted in the dataset. Since the regression model uses 
lagged aid as the key independent variable to explain current economic growth, the 
regression in the second period is like to suffer from the potential problem of noisy data. 
Column (3) drops the observations using the first period aid and still gets consistent 
results. 
 The previous literature uses fiscal surplus, money supply M2 and openness to 
trade as measurements of fiscal policy, monetary policy and trade policy. Thus, Column 
(4) replaces government expenditure with fiscal surplus. Compared to the baseline 
regression, sample size drops by roughly a half. Column (5) substitutes money supply 
M2 for inflation rate. In Column (6), both government expenditure and inflation rate are 
replaced by the alternative measures. In the last column, considering different 
measurements may capture elements from different aspects, I simply include fiscal 
surplus and money supply M2 as additional control variables. Column (5) shows 
essentially the same results as baseline regression, while other columns display larger 
marginal effects due to dramatically reduced sample sizes. However, the signs and 
significance of coefficient estimates are not changed and therefore, the previous 
conclusions are still preserved. 
2.6.2. Further Exploration 
Equation (1) explains the aid effectiveness on income per capita growth, measured by 
night lights per capita growth, and therefore focuses on the impact of foreign aid on 
                                                 
24 The mean of logged aid variables in the first period are 1.448, 3.323, 2.687 and 1.612, and in the 
second period are 2.938, 5.436, 5.131 and 2.676. 
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welfare and living standards. An increase in income per capita can result from an 
increase in total income (total night lights) or decrease in population or both. To 
distinguish which channel is more important in Sub-Saharan Africa, Table 7 Column 
(1) replaces the night lights per capita growth and night lights per capita level with total 
night lights growth and total night lights level in ADM2 i and keeps everything else 
unchanged. All the aid variables retain the same sign – aid tends to have positive impact 
on total lights growth at ADM2 level, but becomes negative at more aggregate levels. 
However, the magnitudes of coefficients are much smaller than in Table (4): doubling 
aid amount only increases total income by around 6% through both direct effects and 
spillover effects. Moreover, the negative influence at the more aggregate levels is also 
cut substantially. However, I do observe that aid tends to promote total economic 
activities at local level and do the opposite at more aggregate levels. The pattern of aid 
effectiveness on total income of local regions is consistent with the baseline result in 
aid-growth regression (Table (4), Column (6)). 
 Column (2) uses population growth in region i as the dependent variable and 
population head counts as the lagged level variable. All the aid variables have reversed 
signs: aid tends to reduce population growth at ADM2 level but promote it at more 
aggregate levels. The negative impact of aid received by ADM2 i on the population 
growth in the same ADM2 is not statistically significant. The negative sign can be 
explained by income effects: as income increases, people tend to reduce fertility rate as 
well as population growth, just like the trend in rich countries in recent years. The 
negative impact from neighbors is probably due to labor movements – when aid comes 
in the neighbors, it creates new job opportunities there and attracts workers from nearby 
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regions; as a result, labor tends to move from region i to its neighbors and therefore 
region i would see a decrease in population growth, as argued by Askarov and 
Doucouliagos (2015a). Aid received at more aggregate levels, could attract labor 
immigration in a larger area, and tends to promote population growth. But we should be 
aware that the size of the impact on population growth is pretty small and is 
economically insignificant. 
 Column (3) adds the quadratic terms of all aid variables to capture the potential 
non-linear aid effectiveness. Based on Clemens et al. (2012), aid exhibits diminishing 
returns, which could be captured by the positive marginal effects of aid on growth and 
negative quadratic aid terms. Except for weighted aid from neighbors, all the direct aid 
variables and their quadratic terms are consistent with diminishing returns patterns, 
which suggests the aid effectiveness is a downward parabola. The x-coordinates of the 




 are 7.195 , 
5.131, and 6.568. Since the mean of logged aid variables are 3.183, 4.884, and 3.728, all 
the direct aid variables except for weighted aid are on the upward sloping part of their 
effectiveness. The coefficients of 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀2  and 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀1are statistically significant at 
conventional levels while aid received at country level does not show significance. We 
can conclude that there exist diminishing returns to aid directly received at each level in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, and all of them fall on the left side of the vertices - the positive 
marginal effects part. No evidence shows diminishing returns to aid spillovers 
𝑎𝑖𝑑−𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀2 . On the contrary, aid spillovers display increasing returns, but the coefficient 
is not statistically significant. The vertex (minimum point) of the weighted aid has x-
coordinate 5.576. Since an average country has logged weighted aid of 5.682, the 
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amount of average weighted aid, is located at the upward-sloping part of its 
effectiveness parabola. The functional channels of aid spillovers are mainly resource 
movements, income effects and technology and knowledge spillovers, which are very 
different from direct aid which tends to promote investment and capital accumulation 
directly. Probably that is one reason no evidence shows diminishing returns to weighted 
aid received by nearby regions. Based on theories of increasing returns and endogenous 
growth, one possibility is that the spillovers, at least partly, function through technology 
and knowledge spillovers channels, because technology and knowledge exhibit 
increasing returns in the production process (Romer, 1986). 
 Burnside and Dollar (2000) analyze aid effectiveness conditional on policy and 
conclude that aid promotes growth in developing countries with good fiscal, monetary 
and trade policies while aid has little effects otherwise. They build a composite policy 
index based on the contribution of each policy variable (fiscal policy, monetary policy 
and trade policy) to growth. Next, they include policy and interaction between aid and 
policy as the independent variable in the aid-growth regression. To make our results 
comparable with their research and other literature, I use fiscal surplus and money 
supply as measurements of fiscal policy and monetary policy. Following their 
procedure, Column (4) reports the 2SLS regression results. All the aid variables are 
consistent with the baseline specification, while all the interaction terms are statistically 
insignificant. There is no evidence showing aid effectiveness is conditional on policy, 
which is consistent with Askarov and Doucouliagos (2015b). One reason might be that 
all the policies are measured at country level so they are not very accurate when we are 
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considering the local effectiveness and local spillovers. Another possible reason is that 
the policy data quality of Africa is poor and unable to give indication for this issue. 
Apart from policy, institution is another condition which determines aid 
effectiveness argued by aid literature. Burnside and Dollar (2000) find aid has positive 
effects on growth conditional on institutional quality. In Column (5), I include the 
interaction between aid and ICRG score, where ICRG score is a proxy for institutions 
measured at country level. All the coefficients of aid variables switch signs while the 
interaction terms have consistent signs with the baseline regression. Aid received at 
local level has positive impact conditional on institutions and negative conditional 
effect beyond that. An average country has ICRG score 56.721, so average conditional 
effects of aid variables are 9.359, 6.977, -12.535 and -15.201. As a result, the net aid 
effectiveness of aid variables are positive, positive, negative and negative, consistent 
with the baseline regression. The interaction terms at ADM2 level are only marginally 
significant, which means probably no strong evidence shows that there might exist 
systematically stories why institutions could affect aid effectiveness in this way. The 
negative signs of interactions at more aggregated levels are unexpected. One possibility 
is still that, we have the same problem as discussed in the policy issue: aid effectiveness 
conditional on national institutions are probably inaccurate and the results should be 
interpreted with caution. Similarly, Chong et al. (2009) find little evidence that better 
institutions could increase aid effectiveness. 
2.7. Concluding Remarks 
This article investigates aid effectiveness and aid spillovers at the sub-national level in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Overcoming the aggregation bias and potential simultaneity 
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problem, detailed aid effectiveness patterns have been revealed by using GIS and spatial 
analytical techniques. Using ADM2 as the administrative unit of analysis, I find that aid 
targeted at local level tends to promote local economic growth, while aid received at 
more aggregate levels depresses local economic activities. There exist positive aid 
spillovers of aid across adjacent neighbors at the local level. The conclusion is very 
robust to outliers exclusion and different model specifications. I also find that, aid at the 
local level promotes total economic flourish and slows down population growth, while 
aid at more aggregate levels depresses total economic activities but stimulates 
population growth. Aid directly received at all levels exhibits diminishing returns, while 
aid spillovers show weak increasing returns. There is no systematical evidence showing 
that aid effectiveness depends on policy or institutions. 
 The above findings have very profound policy implications. If the aim is to 
promote local economic growth, we should focus more on specifically targeted and 
less-fungible aid projects rather than aid generally given to governments at more 
aggregate levels. Aid at more aggregate levels might be misappropriated for other 
purposes and create reek-seeking problems to cause corruption and hurt institutional 
environment. 
 Aid received by one ADM2 is likely to positively impact its neighbors’ growth, 
generating positive spillovers. The possible channels are resource movements and 
technology and knowledge dissemination. To promote the positive spillovers, we should 
reduce barriers to these activities within the country. 
 Based on the neo-classical theory, aid directly received is supposed to increase 
investment and capital accumulation, which should exhibit diminishing returns. My 
70 
findings are consistent with this theory. However, aid spillovers do not promote capital 
accumulation in neighbor regions and on the opposite, exhibit increasing returns. 
Although this result is not statistically significant, we can still argue that aid spillovers 
partly function through technology and knowledge dissemination, which is consistent 
with the new-growth theory. If this story is true, promoting positive aid spillovers is 
very desirable to increase the effectiveness of aid. 
 However, there are some limitations in this article. For example, policy and 
institutions measurements are not available at the sub-national level. As a result, I did 
not find any systematic story about conditional aid effectiveness. If data are available in 
the future, that will be a very interesting investigation topic.   
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Figure 2.1: Aid Projects at ADM2 Level in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Note: This map shows ADM2 boundaries and aid projects at ADM2 level in Sub-
Saharan Africa. ADM2 boundaries are drawn as polygons and aid projects at ADM2 




Figure 2.2: Aid Projects at ADM1 Level in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Note: This map shows ADM1 boundaries and aid projects at ADM1 level in Sub-
Saharan Africa. ADM1 boundaries are drawn as polygons and aid projects at ADM1 




Figure 2.3: Aid Projects at Country Level in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Note: This map shows country boundaries and aid projects at country level in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Country boundaries are drawn as polygons and aid projects at country 




Table 2.1: Data Sources for the Main Variables 
 Data Sources 
Aid AidData (2015) 
Night lights NOAA (2015) 
Population CIESIN and CIAT (2015) 
Administrative boundary Global Administrative Areas Database (2015) 
Conflicts ACLED (2016), UCDP (2016) 
Air temperature University of Delaware (2016) 
Precipitation University of Delaware (2016) 
Government expenditure as a share of GDP WDI (2016) 
Inflation rate WDI (2016) 
Money supply as a share of GDP WDI (2016) 
Openness as a share of GDP WDI (2016) 
Fiscal surplus as a share of GDP WDI (2016) 







Table 2.2: Summary Statistics 
 N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀2 11,619 220,932.9 946,818.8 0 2.88e+07 
𝑎𝑖𝑑−𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀2  11,619 228,552 568,713.4 0 1.22e+07 
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀1 11,619 81,411.43 211,936.4 0 3,420,069 
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
 11,619 7,071.052 19,378.9 0 134,349.4 
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡(%) 11,619 0.043 0.735 -16.081 18.651 
ln(1 + 𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑖−1,𝑡) 11,619 5.054 2.864 0 11.203 
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 11,619 181,432.9 224,338.6 26.922 4,021,980 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 11,619 59.737 737.316 0 40,191.03 
𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 11,548 24.387 3.894 5.858 30.858 
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 11,548 88.333 45.954 0.460 325.654 
𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 11,619 13.669 4.905 2.804 28.930 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 11,619 19.689 37.427 -4.476 319.518 
𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 11,559 27.709 15.863 8.552 78.341 
𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 11,619 65.500 27.987 19.428 253.047 
𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 6,193 -1.360 3.662 -9.447 21.973 








Table 2.3: Simultaneity Regression 










      
𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 0.057***     
 (0.021)     
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 -0.002***     
 (0.0006)     
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡  -21.180* -14.680* 23.190* 11.850* 
  (12.040) (8.592) (13.070) (6.843) 
Constant -1.320**     
 (0.541)     
      
Observations 22,584 15,056 15,056 15,056 15,056 
R-squared 0.034 -22.038 -9.793 -23.974 -9.627 
Number of ADM2 3,764 3,764 3,764 3,764 3,764 
ADM2 FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
p-value of F statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen J - 0.518 0.167 0.130 0.878 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This table displays the results of Equation (2), regressing growth on 
aid with air temperature and precipitation as instruments for growth. Column (1) shows the first-stage regression with  𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 as the dependent 





 as dependent variables, 







Table 2.4: Baseline Regression Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀2 0.979*** 0.861***  0.667***  0.649*** -0.0004 
 (0.116) (0.107)  (0.077)  (0.074) (0.001) 
𝑎𝑖𝑑−𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀2   0.405***  0.611***  0.606*** -0.0003 
  (0.052)  (0.071)  (0.069) (0.001) 
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀1   -0.790*** -1.042***  -0.945*** -0.009*** 
   (0.081) (0.115)  (0.104) (0.002) 
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
     -0.680*** -0.234*** -0.006*** 
     (0.067) (0.031) (0.002) 
ln(1 + 𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑖−1,𝑡) -17.660*** -16.430*** -28.010*** -28.910*** -25.540*** -30.280*** -18.280*** 
 (3.519) (3.866) (3.314) (3.477) (2.991) (3.482) (2.425) 
𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.233*** -0.283*** -0.050*** -0.342*** -0.159*** -0.386*** -0.002 
 (0.033) (0.041) (0.015) (0.045) (0.018) (0.048) (0.002) 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.044*** -0.059*** -0.020*** -0.089*** 0.048*** -0.069*** 0.003*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.004) (0.012) (0.005) (0.010) (0.0008) 
𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 0.020*** 0.027*** -0.009*** 0.018*** -0.010*** 0.015*** -0.002*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.0003) 
𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.061*** -0.077*** 0.081*** 0.020 0.064*** 0.031** 0.010*** 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.011) (0.014) (0.007) (0.014) (0.001) 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 0.0003* 0.0002 9.83e-06 0.0002 3.67e-05 0.0002 -1.85e-05 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (6.80e-05) (0.0002) (2.09e-05) 
Constant 1.991*** 0.769 2.933*** 3.801*** 2.336*** 4.231*** 0.021 
 (0.524) (0.564) (0.443) (0.725) (0.317) (0.731) (0.072) 
        
Observations 11,386 11,386 11,386 11,386 11,386 11,386 11,619 
R-squared -15.523 -18.662 -10.263 -27.472 -4.912 -27.047 0.270 
Number of ADM2 2,863 2,863 2,863 2,863 2,863 2,863 3,096 
ADM2 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
p-value of F statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 394.924 164.658 590.419 74.705 1201.773 56.872 - 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 78.642 35.205 104.665 27.981 129.458 21.681 - 






Table 2.5: Robustness Check to Outliers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 1st<growth<99th income>0 income<99th income<95th aid<99th aid<95th 
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀2 0.113*** 0.702*** 0.364*** 0.131*** 0.682*** 0.899*** 
 (0.007) (0.083) (0.041) (0.014) (0.079) (0.112) 
𝑎𝑖𝑑−𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀2  0.108*** 0.727*** 0.344*** 0.126*** 0.610*** 0.676*** 
 (0.006) (0.085) (0.038) (0.013) (0.071) (0.085) 
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀1 -0.170*** -1.027*** -0.538*** -0.200*** -0.966*** -1.200*** 
 (0.009) (0.117) (0.058) (0.020) (0.108) (0.145) 
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
 -0.040*** -0.302*** -0.131*** -0.048*** -0.231*** -0.170*** 
 (0.004) (0.040) (0.017) (0.006) (0.032) (0.033) 
ln(1 + 𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑖−1,𝑡) -14.420*** -30.200*** -28.140*** -28.760*** -30.600*** -33.150*** 
 (1.182) (3.627) (3.429) (2.504) (3.553) (3.964) 
𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.072*** -0.536*** -0.221*** -0.085*** -0.413*** -0.633*** 
 (0.005) (0.066) (0.027) (0.010) (0.053) (0.083) 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.013*** -0.073*** -0.039*** -0.014*** -0.071*** -0.109*** 
 (0.001) (0.011) (0.005) (0.002) (0.010) (0.015) 
𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 0.002*** 0.005 0.008*** 0.003*** 0.017*** 0.0280*** 
 (0.0007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.0008) (0.004) (0.006) 
𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 0.010*** -0.014 0.022*** 0.013*** 0.035** 0.100*** 
 (0.003) (0.018) (0.008) (0.003) (0.015) (0.021) 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 2.61e-05 0.0002 9.75e-05 2.47e-05 0.0001 1.29e-05 
 (3.44e-05) (0.0002) (9.98e-05) (3.81e-05) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
constant 0.690*** 9.384*** 2.311*** 0.764*** 4.507*** 4.324*** 
 (0.128) (1.102) (0.404) (0.150) (0.777) (0.950) 
Observations 11,133 9,678 11,263 10,799 10,905 9,686 
R-squared -5.247 -26.727 -16.652 -6.314 -27.768 -32.992 
Number of ADM2 2,838 2,507 2,837 2,733 2,827 2,661 
ADM2 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
p-value of F statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 279.542 47.479 95.961 232.189 52.492 38.100 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 121.845 20.363 23.095 29.875 20.960 17.880 






Table 2.6: Robustness Check to Model Specifications 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES n≥2 n≥3 no first period aid fiscal surplus M2 fiscal surplus and M2 fiscal surplus and M2 added 
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀2 1.235*** 1.381*** 0.599*** 1.285*** 0.634*** 1.039*** 1.305*** 
 (0.196) (0.236) (0.077) (0.204) (0.070) (0.136) (0.210) 
𝑎𝑖𝑑−𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀2  1.593*** 1.658*** 0.577*** 1.320*** 0.571*** 0.876*** 1.738*** 
 (0.248) (0.284) (0.074) (0.208) (0.063) (0.115) (0.274) 
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀1 -2.513*** -2.755*** -1.056*** -2.078*** -0.879*** -1.520*** -2.526*** 
 (0.370) (0.436) (0.128) (0.314) (0.093) (0.190) (0.383) 
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
 -1.429*** -1.459*** -0.075*** -1.335*** -0.287*** -1.291*** -1.820*** 
 (0.252) (0.281) (0.025) (0.219) (0.035) (0.172) (0.304) 
ln(1 + 𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑖−1,𝑡) -34.640*** -36.090*** -46.280*** -22.110*** -28.410*** -19.190*** -23.770*** 
 (5.314) (5.789) (4.429) (5.297) (3.180) (3.984) (4.880) 
𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 -1.745*** -1.947*** -0.137***  -0.259***  -1.468*** 
 (0.271) (0.327) (0.037)  (0.034)  (0.229) 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 0.0571* 0.076* -0.091*** -0.164***   0.085*** 
 (0.033) (0.039) (0.014) (0.034)   (0.028) 
𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 0.223*** 0.277*** 0.025*** 0.234*** 0.016*** 0.091*** 0.389*** 
 (0.039) (0.055) (0.005) (0.039) (0.004) (0.018) (0.063) 
𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 0.069 0.306** 0.072** -0.238*** 0.007 0.086** 0.149* 
 (0.083) (0.147) (0.029) (0.078) (0.012) (0.038) (0.076) 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 0.0001 0.001 0.0001 -0.003*** 0.0002*** -9.75e-05 -0.0003 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.0002) (0.0009) (4.84e-05) (5.98e-05) (0.0006) 
𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1    -0.151***  -0.303*** -0.433*** 
    (0.057)  (0.051) (0.083) 
𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1     -0.100*** -0.0009*** -0.446*** 
     (0.014) (0.0002) (0.084) 
constant 10.037** -4.177 -0.902 3.531 6.099*** -8.261*** 6.709 
 (4.378) (5.678) (1.087) (3.370) (0.825) (2.637) (3.704)* 
Observations 5,219 4,892 8,589 5,921 11,809 6,404 5,633 
R-squared -41.340 -46.401 2,863 -46.417 -25.385 -31.182 -48.608 
Number of ADM2 1,893 1,823 -18.476 2,137 3,024 2,298 2,065 
ADM2 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
p-value of F statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 13.820 11.530 46.714 14.217 62.108 22.923 12.752 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F  11.614 9.875 17.828 11.265 23.261 16.992 11.211 






Table 2.7: Further Explorations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES total lights population quadratic aid policy institutions 
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀2 0.052*** -4.78e-05 2.662*** 0.817* -8.061* 
 (0.009) (4.38e-05) (1.029) (0.465) (4.616) 
𝑎𝑖𝑑−𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀2  0.060*** -0.0001*** -2.035 0.750*** -5.905* 
 (0.008) (4.14e-05) (2.029) (0.277) (3.257) 
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀1 -0.063*** 0.0002*** 5.136* -1.870*** 10.560* 
 (0.012) (6.51e-05) (2.752) (0.594) (5.618) 
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
 -0.037*** 0.0001*** 1.603 -0.493 13.080** 
 (0.005) (2.08e-05) (2.874) (2.301) (6.293) 
(𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀2)2   -0.185**   
   (0.078)   
(𝑎𝑖𝑑−𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀2 )2   0.182   
   (0.151)   
(𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀1)2   -0.501**   
   (0.236)   
(𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
)2   -0.122   
   (0.262)   
ln(1 + 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖−1,𝑡) -0.778*** 0.011*** 1.557 -20.790*** -50.020*** 
 (0.019) (0.0009) (17.840) (4.105) (15.980) 
𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.035*** 2.63e-05 0.445  1.277 
 (0.007) (2.96e-05) (0.343)  (0.785) 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.005*** -2.05e-05*** 0.055  0.411* 
 (0.001) (6.36e-06) (0.105)  (0.221) 
𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 0.0004 -6.50e-05*** -0.024**  0.090** 
 (0.0006) (2.22e-06) (0.010)  (0.040) 
𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 0.030*** 2.15e-05** -0.067* -0.076 0.029 
 (0.003) (9.46e-06) (0.035) (0.096) (0.096) 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 -4.03e-05 3.64e-08 -0.0001 -7.22e-05 0.002 
 (4.00e-05) (1.30e-07) (0.0004) (8.29e-05) (0.001) 
𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1    -79.540***  
    (26.410)  






Continued Table 7      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES total lights population quadratic aid policy institutions 
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀2 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1    3.526  
    (11.330)  
𝑎𝑖𝑑−𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀2 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1    0.434  
    (6.127)  
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀1 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1    4.253  
    (12.850)  
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1    -13.950  
    (55.710)  
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀2 ∗ 𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1     0.165* 
     (0.089) 
𝑎𝑖𝑑−𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀2 ∗ 𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1     0.123* 
     (0.064) 
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝐷𝑀1 ∗ 𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1     -0.221** 
     (0.110) 
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
∗ 𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1     -0.268** 
     (0.127) 
constant 5.215*** -0.034*** -91.933 108.047 312.634** 
 (0.381) (0.006) (256.415) (347.632) (132.134) 
      
Observations 11,386 11,386 11,386 6,404 11,386 
R-squared 0.286 0.409 -66.765 -31.332 -250.554 
Number of ADM2 2,863 2,863 2,863 2,298 2,863 
ADM2 FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
p-value of F statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 32.908 30.434 0.598 1.741 0.805 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 10.714 9.856 1.128 0.598 0.556 




Appendix 2.A. Country List 
Table 2.A.1: Country List 
Angola Gabon Nigeria 
Benin Gambia, The Rwanda 
Botswana Ghana São Tomé and Principe 
Burkina Faso Guinea Senegal 
Burundi Guinea-Bissau Seychelles 
Cabo Verde Kenya Sierra Leone 
Cameroon Lesotho Somalia 
Central African Republic Liberia South Africa 
Chad Madagascar South Sudan 
Comoros Malawi Sudan 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Mali Swaziland 
Congo, Rep Mauritania Tanzania 
Côte d'Ivoire Mauritius Togo 
Equatorial Guinea Mozambique Uganda 
Eritrea Namibia Zambia 
Ethiopia Niger Zimbabwe 
Source: World Bank 
Appendix 2.B. GIS Processing Details 
This research heavily relies on Geographic Information Systems (GIS) knowledge and 
skills to process the data. This appendix summarizes the major GIS work used in this 
paper.   
 Country boundary polygon data are from the Global Administrative Areas 
Database. This database provides administrative boundaries data at different levels (up 
to ADM5, only available for France and Rwanda at that level) for each country. Many 
countries have the data at a more aggregated administrative level (such as ADM1 or 
ADM2), but not at a less aggregated level (such as ADM4 or ADM5). For most Sub-
Saharan countries, ADM2 is the reasonable choice because that is the administrative 
level that could balance precision at sub-national level against availability of the data 
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for many countries. The database provides boundaries for each individual country as a 
single map, and I use the Plugin “MMQGIS” in QGIS (Version 2.10.1) to merge the 
individual countries into a single continent25. 
 To capture the spillover effects, a matrix containing the information how one 
ADM2 is related to other ADM2s by using certain weights needs to be established. In 
this paper, I use adjacency weighting. The weighting matrices are calculated using R 
(Version 3.2.4 Revised). The package “spdep” provides the function “poly2nb”, which 
can extract the information of the adjacent neighbors for each ADM2 to build the 
adjacency matrix.  
 Aid data are from the World Bank Geocoded Research Release, Level 1, 
Version 1.3 database complied by AidData, which covers 5881 projects (5684 geocoded 
projects) with 61243 locations (one project can have multiple locations) around the 
world over 1995-2014. Each record has a precision code value attached to indicate the 
precision of the location aid is targeted. The precision levels are: 
Table 2.A.2: Precision Code Table 
Precision Code 
Value  
Precision Code Description 
1 coordinates correspond to an exact location or populated place 
2 coordinates correspond to a location that is known to be within 25km of the 
coordinates or a division smaller than ADM2 
3 coordinates correspond to an ADM2 division (as defined by GAUL) 
4 coordinates correspond to an ADM1 division (as defined by GAUL) 
5 estimated coordinates of a large feature, such as rivers or national parks 
6 coordinates correspond to the entire country, project operates in sub-national locales 
but they are not known 
8 coordinates correspond to the entire country, it is likely that the funding goes to a 
government ministry or financial institution  
Note: This table is copied directly from the attached pdf file of the database. The initial 
table does not have “7” value. 
 
                                                 
25 One advantage of using QGIS is that it can read zip files directly. Since the Global Administrative 
Areas Database makes the data of each country a zip file, using QGIS is much more time-efficient than 
other computer programs. 
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I calculate the aid flowing to an ADM2 by summing the aid records with precision code 
no more than 3 within the boundary of that ADM2, and the aid flowing to an ADM1 
with precision code value 4, and the aid flowing to a country beyond 4. All the 
calculations are computed in R (Version 3.2.4 Revised). 
 This paper uses night lights data as the proxy for economic activities, 
considering the unavailability of GDP data at sub-national level and poor quality of 
GDP data at country-level in Sub-Saharan Africa. The night lights dataset uses 30 arc-
second pixels (1/120th of a degree of latitude and longitude, approximately 0.86 square 
kilometers at the equator) to represent the light intensity on the earth. Pixels are on a 
scale from 0 to 63, with 0 no light and 63 the highest lights intensity. The data shows 
the yearly average lights intensity on the earth over 1992-2013. For some years, two 
satellites were used and the data are reported separately. For the overlapping years, this 
paper takes the average of the both satellites, which is consistent with the convention26. 
I use ArcGIS desktop (Version 10.3) to create a Model Builder27 which incorporates the 
toolbox command “Zonal Statistics as Table” to sum and export the total lights falling 
within each ADM2. 
 The population count grid data are from CIESIN and CIAT, with 2.5 arc-
minutes resolution (about 4.625 kilometers times 4.625 kilometers at the equator) in 
years 1990, 1995 and 2000, also the estimated data in 2005, 2010 and 2015. The dataset 
is based on national census survey so the data are only available every five years. I use 
interpolation to calculate the population data for the rest of the years. This has been the 
one of the best available and one of the most popular data sources at sub-national level 
                                                 
26 “Night Lights and ArcGIS: A Brief Guide”, http://economics.mit.edu/files/8945 
27 Using Model Builder is an efficient way to process multiple collections of the data using the same 
procedure. 
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as far as I know. I followed almost the same procedure as the night lights data to 
calculate and export the population data in each ADM2: using ArcGIS desktop (Version 
10.3) to create a Model Builder which incorporates the toolbox command “Zonal 
Statistics as Table” to sum the data up at ADM2-level. 
 After getting the night lights data and population data in each ADM2, the night 
lights per capita, which is a proxy for well-being or standard of living, is just computed 
by dividing total night lights by total population in that ADM228. 
 Conflicts geocoded data are from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data 
Project (ACLED) (1997-2015) and Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) (1987-
2012). Each conflict event is displayed as a point on the map with additional 
explanatory information attached. I use ArcGIS (Version 10.3) Model Builder with 
“Kernel Density” tool incorporated to build a raster map of conflicts kernel density 
weighted by facilities in each year, and extract the density based on ADM2 polygons29.  
 Air temperature and precipitation data are got from the databases “Terrestrial 
Air Temperature: 1900-2014 Gridded Monthly Time Series (Version 4.01)” and 
“Terrestrial Precipitation: 1900-2014 Gridded Monthly Time Series (Version 4.01)”, 
which are available on the website of Center for Climatic Research, Department of 
Geography, University of Delaware. The data are monthly time-series data from 1900 to 
2014, with 0.5 by 0.5 degree resolution (about 55.5 kilometers by 55.5 kilometers at the 
                                                 
28 Since night lights data and population data do not have the same resolution, resampling the data and 
doing raster calculation to make a single raster map for night lights per capita would cause unnecessary 
information loss and thus the result might not be very accurate. Calculating total lights and population 
falling within one ADM2 and then dividing the two numbers to get night lights per capita is more 
desirable. 
29 Some previous work just simply sum the conflicts based on each ADM2. However, a conflict event 
displayed as a point does not necessarily indicate that event was happening at a single point and was 
confined within that ADM2 (since no precision code is attached). Many conflict events are destructive, or 
at least, disruptive, in some scope, so I build kernel density first instead of simply summing them up. 
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equator). Since the resolution is not very precise at ADM2-level, I use the “small” 
option30 from the function “extract” from “raster” package used in R (Version 3.2.4 
Revised) to preserve more observations for the yearly average as well as the dispersion 
in one year of air temperature and precipitation in each ADM2.  
  
                                                 
30 Otherwise no value would be returned if the polygon does not touch the center of any raster cells. 
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Chapter 3: Foreign Aid Allocation and Conflict in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: A Spatial Analytical Approach 
3.1. Introduction 
Foreign aid has become an increasingly important part of international assistance in 
recently years. Tremendous amount of aid has flown to the less developed countries 
(LDC) around the world during the last decade. There have been concerns about the 
effectiveness of foreign aid, as well as its impacts on other aspects of social and 
economic development, such as peace.  
 In many situations, wars and violence are destructive. They not only abrupt law 
and order for normal economic activities, but also destroy or run out infrastructure, 
labor and other resources which could have been used for production. As such, violence 
is an important concern in poverty eradication and economic development promotion 
considerations. The possible effects of foreign aid on armed conflict has been a hotly 
debated topic in recent aid-related literature. 
 Most of the studies of this topic focus on the impacts of aid received by a 
country on the conflict falling within its territory, and many use panel data for the 
investigations. Collier and Hoeffler (2002) find that aid does not affect conflict risk 
directly, but does affect it indirectly through growth rate and primary commodity 
exports. Collier and Hoeffler (2007) note that aid can increase military spending, which 
can fuel conflict, or reduce conflict if rebellions are deterred. De Ree and Nillesen 
(2009) find aid flows have a significant negative impact on the probability of conflict to 
continue, but not on the probability of conflict to start. Nielsen et al. (2011) conclude 
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that a reduction in aid flows could lead to increased probability of conflict onset in 139 
countries. 
 The investigations at country level provide invaluable insights of the effects of 
aid on conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, a typical region of aid receiving. However, in 
many situations, both aid and conflict can be viewed as local activities. As a result, 
exploring this topic at local level is necessary.  Crost et al. (2014) use an arbitrary 
poverty line as the cutoff for regression discontinuity design in Philippines, and find 
that barely eligible municipalities have more conflict casualties than barely ineligible 
counterparts. Findley et al. (2011) employ geo-referenced aid data and conclude that 
fungible aid tends to promote conflict in three African countries. Strandow et al. (2016) 
also investigate this topic by using the geo-referenced data, and find that aid is 
positively related to the probability of violent conflict under a matching design. 
 Following Findley et al. (2011) and Strandow et al. (2016), this paper also uses 
geo-referenced aid data from AidData.org to investigate the possible impacts of aid on 
armed conflict at individual aid project points. Instead of focusing on the probability of 
conflict onset or continuation, I will capture conflict intensity by investigating the 
effects of aid on local aid occurrences and fatalities. Also, I will look at conflict of 
different time precisions and of different types. To my best knowledge, this paper is the 
first one to investigate the effects of local aid on local conflict occurrences and fatalities 
of different time precisions and types. 
 However, the impacts of aid on conflict is not easy to identify because donors 
may give aid based on their anticipated conflict in recipients or other factors that are 
closely related to conflict. The potential endogeneity problem has prevented the cause 
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effects of aid on conflict from being identified. Perhaps the most popular way of solving 
this problem is to use instrument variables, which are supposed to be correlated with 
aid, but not directly correlated with conflict. For example, Collier and Hoeffler (2002) 
use lagged aid variable to instrument aid in current period. What is more, De Ree and 
Nillesen (2009) use GDP levels of donor countries as instruments for aid given to 
recipients. The aid effectiveness literature also provides possible instruments such as 
population sizes in recipient countries (Boone, 1994; Burnside and Dollar, 2000) and 
historical, political and cultural connections between donors and recipients (Rajan and 
Subramanian, 2008; Lessmann and Markwardt, 2012). Also, other solutions have been 
adopted as well. For example, Nielsen et al. (2011) address endogeneity problem by 
using matching method to make the aid shocks “as if random”. 
 Once focusing on the local level, the conventional instruments for aid variable 
such as the donors’ or recipients’ characteristics or the relations between donors and 
recipients do not vary within one country. With limited choices, lagged aid may serve as 
workable instruments for current aid – conditional on other control variables, lagged aid 
variables are correlated with current aid, but do not affect conflict directly. 
Instrumenting for current aid enables me to bypass the endogeneity problem and make 
indicative results for further explorations. 
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 gives numerical models 
being used in empirical test; Chapter 3 introduced both spatial and non-spatial data and 
summarizes statistics of the data; Chapter 4 shows regression results with further 
exploration; the last chapter concludes and makes further discussions. 
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3.2. Empirical Model 
To investigate the possible effects of aid on conflict at local level, based on current 
literature (De Ree and Nillesen, 2009; Findley et al, 2011), I use the following 
regression model: 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ ln(1 + 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛾
′𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡
+ 𝑖,𝑡        (1) 
Where 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡+1 is the number of conflict occurrences or fatalities in region i at t. In 
current aid literature, four-year period is often built to smooth economic fluctuations. 
Following Burnside and Dollar (2000), Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Clemens et al. 
(2012), I construct four-year windows as the time unit of my study. 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is the 
conflict intensity in current period. The aid variable 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡  is the aid commitment to 
region i at time t, in terms of US dollars. If current aid commitment has impacts on 
future conflict intensity, we should expect the coefficient 𝛽2  is statistically different 
from zero. 𝛿𝑖  and 𝛿𝑡  are region fixed effects and time fix effects to capture region-
specific and time specific impacts on future conflict. 
 The control variables are captured by matrix 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 , which includes: logged night 
lights as proxy for economic activities in region i at t; logged population in region i at t; 
natural resource rents as percentage of GDP at country level; ICRG scores for religious 
tensions, ethnic tensions and military in politics, all of which are measured at country 
level. All these control variables are expected to affect future conflict directly. 
3.3. Data 
The aid dataset being used in this article is from AidData.org. AidData provides data for 
5684 geocoded aid projects in 61243 locations worldwide over 1995-2014. One project 
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can be located in multiple places, and in that case, the aid amount is evenly split to each 
location. For each location, a precision code is also attached to indicate the coverage 
scope, from an exact location to the entire country. Based on the data record, 1-3 are 
assigned to aid projects within ADM2s (second administrative divisions, equivalent to 
U.S. counties), 4 to aid projects within ADM1s (first administrative divisions, 
equivalent to U.S. states), 5 and above to the country level. For most aid projects in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, the precision codes are no more than 3, which mean these aid 
projects are at most targeted at an area no larger than ADM2s, such as districts or 
counties. For aid going to ADM1s, I divide the total amount of aid by the numbers of 
ADM2s in that ADM1, to get the fair share of aid amount to each ADM2. For aid going 
to a country, I follow the same step to calculate the fair share of aid mount given to each 
ADM2. Then I add aid going directly to ADM2s, the fair share of aid amount to that 
ADM2 at both ADM1 and country levels, to get the total amount of aid each ADM2 
receives. For example, if one ADM2 receives $1,000,000 directly, and it is supposed to 
get $300,000 from ADM1 and $200,000 from the country, the total amount of aid going 
to that ADM2 is $1,500,000. 
 Armed conflict events geocoded datasets are from Armed Conflict Location & 
Event Data Project (ACLED) (1997-2015). Armed conflict events are defined as events 
with political authority (such as government) involved and force used under political 
purposes or motivations. I use both conflict occurrences and fatalities to capture the 
conflict intensity across African continent in different years. Also, a time precision level 
is attached for each conflict event, which can be day, week or month, meaning that 
either the conflict event actually lasted for days, weeks or months, or the event was 
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within several days, weeks or months based on current information. Also, a type is 
assigned to each conflict event, which can be: Battle-No change of territory, Battle-
Non-state actor overtakes territory, Battle-Government regains territory, Headquarters 
or base established, Strategic development, Riots/Protests, Violence against civilians, 
Non-violent transfer of territory, and Remote violence. In this paper, I combine the first 
three types into one single composite type – Battle, since essentially they are the same 
in nature regardless of the final results. 
 Administrative boundary datasets are from Global Administrative Areas 
Database, which are available at different administrative levels (district, provincial and 
national levels). To control for other possible factors that are correlated with conflict, I 
use night lights data from NOAA as proxy for economic activities, and gridded 
population data from CIESIN and CIAT, both of which vary at local level. 
 The control variable natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP is retrieved 
from World Development Indicators (WDI), as an approximation for part of resources 
available for being looted. Scores for religious tensions, ethnic tensions and military in 
politics are from ICRG, being measured on a 0 to 6 scale, with 0 the highest religious 
tensions, the highest ethnic tensions and the highest military in politics for each case. 
 Table 1 lists the main datasets and their sources. Table 2 shows the summary 
statistics of the data. 
3.4. Regression Results 
Table 3 shows the regression results for equation (1), using total conflict occurrences 
and fatalities as dependent variables. Columns (1) and (6) only include aid, current 
conflict level and fixed effects, instrumenting current aid by aid in two lagged periods 
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(t-1 and t-2). Based on the two columns, Columns (2) and (7) add ADM2 level control 
variables – total lights and population. Country level control variables – natural 
resources rents, religious tensions, ethnic tensions, and military in politics are 
introduced into Columns (3) and (8) as well. My baseline regressions, as displayed in 
Columns (3) and (8), include variable of interest, current conflict, ADM2 level control 
variables and country level control variables, and two way fixed effects, with current 
aid being instrumented by aid in two lagged periods. Current aid tends to negatively 
affect both future conflict occurrences and fatalities – a one percentage point increase in 
aid tends to decrease conflict occurrences by 0.00258 and conflict fatalities by 0.01321, 
or doubling aid tends to decrease conflict occurrences by 0.258 and conflict fatalities by 
1.321. Regions with higher current conflict are likely to suffer higher future conflict, as 
indicated by the estimated coefficient of current conflict occurrences and fatalities. 
Total economic activities, as with night lights as proxy, are positively associated with 
future conflict, with the possibility that more resources are available for being looted. 
Population is negatively correlated with future conflict, but is only significant for 
conflict fatalities. Natural resources rents as a percentage of GDP tends to promote 
future conflict occurrences, but has insignificant impacts on conflict fatalities. Regions 
with higher religious tensions are likely to see higher conflict occurrences and fatalities 
in the next period. Ethnic extensions and military in politics are at most marginally 
significant in contributing future conflict. It is possibly that aid donors choose the 
receipt regions by conflict in the previous period. In Columns (4) and (9), I calculate the 
propensity score of aid receiving based on characteristics in the previous period and add 
the score as additional control variable in regression. Adding propensity score does not 
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change my conclusion, but the score itself shows positive and significant effects on 
future conflict. The finding indicates that the expectation of receiving aid can intensify 
conflict, while actual receiving aid tends to reduce conflict. Columns (5) and (9) display 
OLS results, with aid insignificantly impacting conflict occurrences and has much 
smaller effects on conflict fatalities, which indicates that failing to solve the 
endogeneity problem may get misleading conclusions. 
 The finding of negative effects of aid on conflict is consistent with Collier and 
Hoeffler (2002), De Ree and Nillesen (2009), and Nielsen et al. (2011), who find 
statistically and economically significant negative relationships between aid and 
conflict. The possible channels, they argue, are that aid helps to increase government’s 
military power (or potential) to preserve peaceful status, in which aid deters conflict; 
also, aid can also help to promote economic conditions to reduce conflict.  
 Table 4 displays robustness check results for the baseline regressions (Columns 
(3) and (8) in Table (3)). Columns (1) and (6) show the results for those regions with 
positive conflict occurrence and fatalities, respectively. Some regions have extremely 
high conflict, and Columns (2) and (7) restrict regressions being taking for regions 
below the 95th percentile of conflict. Columns (3) and (8) only considers aid mount 
being received to be less than 95th percentile. Columns (5) and (9) only allows regions 
with positive lights and columns (5) and (10) only keep regions with positive 
population. Almost all the results show the pattern which is consistent with the initial 
conclusion. 
 Table 5 displays further exploration. In the first two columns, I take the first 
different of conflict and add fixed effects back to control for potential trend. The 
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coefficients of aid are still negative, but aid now has insignificant effects on conflict 
fatalities. In Columns (3) - (6), I classify countries with lower than mean income as 
low-income countries and high-income countries otherwise. Aid has negative impact on 
both conflict occurrence and fatalities for low-income countries, but insignificant 
effects on high-income countries.  
 Table 6 displays the regression results for conflict occurrences and fatalities by 
time precision, indicating the level of certainty of the date, which can be day, week and 
month. For example, if one conflict event has “week” as its time precision, that means 
either the conflict event actually lasted for weeks, or the event was within several days 
or weeks, but not months. Aid tends to have positive and significant effects on future 
conflict with time precision “day”, but the magnitude and/or statistical significance drop 
as precision moves from day to week to month. Aid seems to be especially effective in 
reducing conflict occurrences or fatalities with higher level of certainty of the date. 
Another possibility is that for conflict events with no accurate information, there are too 
much “noises” for the data quality, which may lead to insignificant results. 
 Table 7 shows the regression results of the impacts of aid on conflict 
occurrences by type. Current aid tends to reduce conflict occurrences with the following 
types: battle, strategic development, violence against civilians, transfer of territory, and 
remote violence. Aid flows are also likely to decrease conflict fatalities with the types: 
battle, riots/protests, violence against civilians, and remote violence. Regression of 
conflict fatalities on aid for transfer of territory is not possible due to too little variation.   
 In the previous regression analyses, I find that total economic activities tends to 
promote conflict while population is negatively associated with future conflict. If that 
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pattern is true, income per capita, a proxy for richness, should be positively correlated 
with future conflict. In this paper, since GDP data are not available at sub-national level 
for most of African countries, I use night lights divided by population to get night lights 
per capita, as a proxy for income per capita. 
 Table 9 shows the regression results for equation (1), with logged night lights 
per capita replacing logged night lights and logged population. By nature, the new 
regression equation is a model with restriction that the coefficient of logged night lights 
being set equal to the coefficient of logged population. The restricted model, however, 
enables us to explore the possible patterns of income per capita and future conflict in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The baseline regressions, as shown in Columns (3) and (7), 
indicates that richer regions tend to see higher conflict occurrences and fatalities in the 
following period. A one percentage point increase in night lights per capita is associated 
with an increase of conflict occurrences by 0.1359 and conflict fatalities by 0.3194 in 
the next period. Once again, OLS regressions fail to solve the endogeneity problem and 
lead to false conclusion that aid has insignificant impacts on conflict, as shown in 
Columns (4) and (8). I also test the effects of aid on conflict occurrences and fatalities 
by time precision and by type, and find similar conclusions as being discussed 
previously. Table 10 shows the tested empirical relationship between income per capita 
and conflict by time precision. Tables 11 and 10 display the regression results of 
conflict occurrences and fatalities on aid. Similar patterns are detected as compared to 
the unrestricted model. 
 The positive association of income per capita and future conflict is confusing 
and counterintuitive. One possible reason is that Sub-Saharan countries have very low 
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income per capita on average, and increasing income marginally means there will be 
more resources available for being looted. After income per capita hits some threshold, 
higher income is negatively correlated with conflict. In other words, the effects of 
income per capita has non-linear impacts on conflict. Table 13 shows the regression 
results with squared logged night lights per capita added based on Table 9. The squared 
logged aid has positive and significant impacts on conflict occurrences, justifying the 
existence of non-linear inverse U shaped relationship between income per capita and 
conflict occurrences. Unfortunately, Sub-Saharan Africa has average night lights per 
capita (0.0287) located on the left-hand side of the topmost point (with x-axis night 
lights per capita 1.0414, about 36 times as the average of Sub-Saharan Africa), and an 
increase in night lights per capita raises conflict occurrences in the following period. No 
significant non-linear effects are detected for conflict fatalities. 
 However, because of unavailability of local GDP per capita data, I use night 
lights as proxy for local economic activities. The previous literature shows positive 
associations existing between GDP and night lights, as well as between GDP per capita 
and income per capita. But it is not the case that once GDP increases, night lights also 
rise proportionately. Henderson et al. (2012) show that the elasticity of measured GDP 
growth to night lights growth is around 0.3. Also, NOAA reported that some bright 
parts of the night lights in Africa were caused by gas flares, which can rarely represent 
human economic activities. The magnitude – the x-axis of the topmost point being 36 
times as much as the average of Sub-Saharan Africa – should be interpreted with 
caution when applying to GDP data. In 2015, Sub-Saharan Africa has GDP per capita 
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2,312 in current US dollars. Multiply it by 36 gets 83,232 US dollars, which is almost 
the income per capita of Switzerland. 
 Tables 14-16 test the non-linearity of income per capita on conflict occurrences 
and fatalities by time precision and by type. The non-linear relationship seems to exist 
only for conflict occurrences with higher levels of time precision, and only for one 
particular type – violence against civilians. 
 Table 17 adds squared logged aid term to test possible non-linear effects of aid 
on future conflict. No evidence is found that aid has non-linear effects on conflict 
occurrences or fatalities when different control variables are introduced. 
3.5. Conclusion 
This paper investigate the effects of aid on future conflict and finds that aid tends to 
reduce both conflict occurrences and fatalities in the following period. That is, aid flows 
help to bring order and peace in the receiving regions. Aid is particularly effective when 
conflict events with higher levels of time precision get involved, or when certain types 
of conflict events are under way. 
 The empirical results shows that income per capita has non-linear effects on 
conflict occurrences. Unfortunately, Sub-Saharan Africa has income per capita located 
on the increasing part of the parabola, so adding income per capita marginally tends to 
increase the resources available to loot, and promote conflict as a result. The non-linear 
pattern also indicates that Sub-Saharan Africa needs a big push to get out of the low-
income-conflict trap. Since aid can reduce conflict occurrences and fatalities, foreign 
aid, as a result, can alleviate conflict and play an important role in this process. 
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Table 3.1: Data Sources 
Data Data Sources 
Aid AidData (2015) 
Conflict ACLED (2017) 
Night lights NOAA (2015) 
Population CIESIN and CIAT (2015) 
Administrative boundary Global Administrative Areas Database (2015) 
Natural Resource Rents WDI (2017) 
Religious tensions ICRG (2013) 
Ethnic tensions ICRG (2013) 




Table 3.2: Summary Statistics of Data 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Conflict Occurrence      
  Total 76940 1.5210 10.6252 0 665 
  By time      
    Day 76940 1.3446 9.6963 0 663 
    Week 76940 0.1033 1.0468 0 89 
    Month 76940 0.0731 1.9050 0 216 
  By type      
    Battle 76940 0.4836 4.9129 0 376 
    Headquarters/base established 76940 0.0096 0.2481 0 26 
    Strategic development 76940 0.1052 1.1485 0 67 
    Riots/protests 76940 0.3485 2.6599 0 134 
    Violence against civilians 76940 0.4694 3.7126 0 259 
    Transfer of territory 76940 0.0298 0.9394 0 158 
    Remote violence 76940 0.0748 1.4499 0 142 
Fatalities      
  Total 76940 8.3752 362.1699 0 64672 
  By time      
    Day 76940 7.2661 338.0884 0 60561 
    Week 76940 0.5718 15.8841 0 2010 
    Month 76940 0.5372 90.7399 0 25000 
  By type      
    Battle 76940 5.4918 318.0226 0 61071 
    Headquarter/base established 76940 0.0003 0.0580 0 15 
    Strategic development 76940 0.0027 0.2320 0 50 
    Riots/protests 76940 0.0917 4.9020 0 1018 
    Violence against civilians 76940 2.3821 98.0157 0 25000 
    Transfer of territory 76940 0.0260 5.0984 0 1000 
    Remote violence 76940 0.3806 21.4675 0 5000 
Aid ($) 76919 6.85e+07 2.95e+08 0 9.47e+09 
Lights 72409 1485.909 4270.281 0 84233 
Population 80073 192782.8 329871.4 0 7955719 
Lights per capita 72409 0.0287 0.1677 0 11.1728 
Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP) 962 13.9099 14.0389 0.0011 89.1661 
Religious tensions 576 4.1663 1.3152 0 6 
Ethnic tensions 576 3.2307 1.1478 0 5 








Table 3.3: Baseline Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES Occurrence Occurrence Occurrence Occurrence Occurrence Fatalities Fatalities Fatalities Fatalities Fatalities 
ln(aid) -0.343*** -0.404*** -0.258*** -0.402*** -0.00748 -1.990*** -2.335*** -1.321*** -1.678*** -0.304** 
 (0.101) (0.126) (0.0728) (0.0986) (0.0194) (0.381) (0.464) (0.315) (0.386) (0.133) 
Conflict 0.563*** 0.567*** 0.522*** 0.512*** 0.339** -0.109 -0.113* -0.0697 -0.0697 -0.000784 
 (0.135) (0.136) (0.178) (0.181) (0.150) (0.0673) (0.0682) (0.0658) (0.0661) (0.00310) 
ln(lights)  0.237*** 0.187*** 0.225*** 0.152***  0.116 0.557** 0.658** 0.123 
  (0.0794) (0.0488) (0.0510) (0.0480)  (0.431) (0.272) (0.285) (0.447) 
ln(population)  -2.742 -2.447* -0.552 -0.561  -14.33*** -9.269*** -4.208* -2.908 
  (1.743) (1.330) (1.313) (1.102)  (4.715) (2.730) (2.544) (2.321) 
Natural resource rents   0.0464*** 0.0132 0.00870   -0.120 -0.208** -0.359*** 
   (0.0170) (0.0157) (0.0114)   (0.110) (0.103) (0.0993) 
Religious tensions   0.915** 1.991*** 0.257*   6.856*** 9.562*** 0.770 
   (0.423) (0.617) (0.131)   (1.667) (2.315) (0.983) 
Ethnic tensions   -0.354* -1.137*** 0.807***   -1.060 -3.046** -0.812 
   (0.185) (0.330) (0.249)   (0.919) (1.301) (1.174) 
Military in politics   0.148 0.334* 0.314**   -1.171** -0.707 0.0700 
   (0.148) (0.175) (0.123)   (0.573) (0.654) (0.550) 
Aid Propensity Score    21.32***     54.96***  
    (4.709)     (15.55)  
Observations 11,538 11,439 9,615 9,615 12,820 11,538 11,439 9,615 9,615 12,820 
R-squared 0.141 0.129 0.132 0.106 0.130 -0.042 -0.070 -0.005 -0.022 0.008 
Number of id 3,846 3,813 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,846 3,813 3,205 3,205 3,205 
ADM2 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
p-value of F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 281.582 204.588 504.738 349.635 - 282.403 205.505 515.039 352.846 - 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 146.614 112.174 259.025 162.123 - 147.168 112.656 266.830 164.680 - 
Stock-Yogo 10% value 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 - 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 - 
Hansen test 0.0030 0.0051 0.3103 0.2964 - 0.9886 0.8412 0.8853 0.4307 - 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 








Table 3.4: Robustness Check 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES Occurrence Occurrence Occurrence Occurrence Occurrence Fatalities Fatalities Fatalities Fatalities Fatalities 
 Conflict>0 Conflict<95th Aid<95th Lights>0 Population>0 Conflict>0 Conflict<95th Aid<95th Lights>0 Population>0 
ln(aid) -0.476*** 0.00280 -0.103* -0.283*** -0.258*** -3.793*** -0.0710*** -0.844*** -1.252*** -1.323*** 
 (0.130) (0.00875) (0.0581) (0.0783) (0.0729) (1.191) (0.0145) (0.194) (0.325) (0.316) 
Conflict 0.491** 0.0141 0.325** 0.530*** 0.522*** -0.105 0.000777 -0.00231 -0.0723 -0.0697 
 (0.193) (0.0164) (0.149) (0.186) (0.178) (0.0933) (0.00118) (0.0521) (0.0668) (0.0658) 
ln(lights) 1.124*** 0.0330*** 0.203*** 0.251*** 0.187*** 6.462* 0.0341 0.579** 0.918*** 0.556** 
 (0.274) (0.0105) (0.0458) (0.0641) (0.0488) (3.327) (0.0257) (0.244) (0.353) (0.272) 
ln(population) -10.77** -0.295* -3.522** -2.918* -2.448* -91.88*** -0.726** -9.358*** -11.05*** -9.265*** 
 (4.729) (0.165) (1.381) (1.600) (1.331) (30.73) (0.307) (2.482) (3.528) (2.731) 
Natural resource rents 0.110** 0.000660 0.0103 0.0654*** 0.0464*** -0.281 -0.0191*** -0.311*** -0.0917 -0.120 
 (0.0524) (0.00226) (0.0132) (0.0213) (0.0170) (0.634) (0.00538) (0.0892) (0.133) (0.110) 
Religious tensions 0.967 -0.119** 0.907** 0.746* 0.915** 8.580 0.338*** 6.260*** 5.533*** 6.858*** 
 (0.999) (0.0489) (0.424) (0.434) (0.423) (5.655) (0.101) (1.716) (1.630) (1.667) 
Ethnic tensions -1.564** 0.0837*** -0.137 -0.561*** -0.353* -0.638 -0.179*** -0.818 -1.097 -1.057 
 (0.755) (0.0306) (0.183) (0.205) (0.185) (7.727) (0.0453) (0.928) (1.020) (0.919) 
Military in politics -0.0345 -0.0389 0.108 -0.199 0.148 -17.29*** -0.0763 -1.028* -3.483*** -1.169** 
 (0.583) (0.0261) (0.125) (0.185) (0.148) (6.081) (0.0518) (0.559) (0.719) (0.574) 
Observations 3,095 9,094 8,764 8,159 9,612 1,513 9,264 8,764 8,159 9,612 
R-squared 0.180 0.141 0.080 0.137 0.132 0.027 0.014 0.011 0.003 -0.005 
Number of id 1,253 3,093 3,080 2,779 3,204 637 3,146 3,080 2,779 3,204 
ADM2 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
p-value of F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 351.941 402.525 481.459 564.286 503.654 173.048 465.070 481.456 569.042 507.010 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 179.881 210.047 257.060 250.582 258.253 84.165 249.347 259.100 254.455 263.077 
Stock-Yogo 10% value 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 
Hansen test 0.4916 0.0000 0.0151 0.4394 0.3114 0.6665 0.0000 0.0879 0.9555 0.8907 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 








Table 3.5: Further Exploration 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Occurrence Fatalities Occurrence Occurrence Fatalities Fatalities 
 First diff. First diff. Low income High income Low income High income 
       
ln(aid) -0.179*** -3.053 -0.701*** -1.262 -2.402*** -6.832 
 (0.0675) (2.378) (0.161) (1.178) (0.644) (4.717) 
Conflict   0.626** 0.407 0.0641 -0.178* 
   (0.287) (0.256) (0.0555) (0.0973) 
ln(lights) 0.578*** 13.52 0.419** 0.281*** 1.067 1.082** 
 (0.133) (9.227) (0.170) (0.0881) (0.757) (0.488) 
ln(population) 1.163 44.00 7.017*** 2.395* 27.09*** -5.116 
 (1.064) (37.67) (2.422) (1.369) (8.283) (6.592) 
Natural resource rents 0.0780*** 1.299 0.112*** 0.101* 0.416*** 0.0936 
 (0.0195) (1.565) (0.0325) (0.0519) (0.134) (0.212) 
Religious tensions 0.697** -0.714 13.32*** 0.476 46.05*** 7.844 
 (0.276) (7.994) (3.204) (1.984) (13.22) (7.619) 
Ethnic tensions 1.997*** -10.60 -1.138* -0.117 -5.526** -0.282 
 (0.607) (6.610) (0.610) (0.443) (2.259) (1.773) 
Military in politics 1.268*** 10.45 0.739*** -1.437* 0.899 -7.737** 
 (0.305) (9.121) (0.275) (0.788) (0.772) (3.232) 
       
Observations 9,615 9,615 2,379 5,703 2,379 5,703 
R-squared 0.035 0.001 0.111 0.114 0.011 0.018 
Number of id 3,205 3,205 1,004 2,201 1,004 2,201 
ADM2 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
p-value of F 0.0000 0.0014 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 506.691 506.691 91.884 78.451 93.736 78.328 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 263.675 263.675 93.442 56.222 93.212 54.460 
Stock-Yogo 10% value 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 
Hansen test 0.7127 0.3631 0.3649 0.0001 0.1191 0.9210 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 







Table 3.6: Conflict by Time Precision 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Day occurrence Week occurrence Month occurrence Day Fatalities Week Fatalities Month Fatalities 
       
ln(aid) -0.220*** -0.0436*** -0.00215 -1.186*** -0.0975 -0.0355 
 (0.0634) (0.0135) (0.00649) (0.254) (0.0956) (0.0283) 
Conflict 0.509*** 0.522** -0.209 -0.0892 -0.0762 -0.240 
 (0.147) (0.262) (0.135) (0.0754) (0.0809) (0.250) 
ln(lights) 0.147*** 0.0115 0.0144** 0.485** -0.00739 0.0721** 
 (0.0432) (0.00768) (0.00607) (0.230) (0.0527) (0.0347) 
ln(population) -2.442** -0.0825 -0.0394 -8.959*** -0.373 -0.0791 
 (1.239) (0.113) (0.0791) (2.486) (0.456) (0.191) 
Natural resource rents 0.0380** 0.00927*** 0.00326** -0.106 -0.0235 0.00566 
 (0.0150) (0.00300) (0.00134) (0.0900) (0.0290) (0.00987) 
Religious tensions 0.857** 0.0833* 0.0152 6.534*** 0.159 0.162 
 (0.392) (0.0447) (0.0221) (1.507) (0.311) (0.138) 
Ethnic tensions -0.383** -0.0534** 0.0184 -0.906 -0.0645 -0.0355 
 (0.171) (0.0246) (0.0165) (0.852) (0.133) (0.0674) 
Military in politics 0.0879 0.0169 -0.0217 -0.986* -0.0885 -0.124* 
 (0.133) (0.0180) (0.0150) (0.514) (0.0923) (0.0661) 
       
Observations 9,615 9,615 9,615 9,615 9,615 9,615 
R-squared 0.122 0.170 0.068 0.001 0.019 0.088 
Number of id 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 
ADM2 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
p-value of F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0034 0.0622 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 504.948 506.938 509.039 508.611 506.512 505.947 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 259.045 263.124 265.535 264.250 263.279 263.260 
Stock-Yogo 10% value 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 
Hansen test 0.1027 0.4368 0.0003 0.8435 0.8249 0.7880 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 








Table 3.7: Conflict Occurrences by Type 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Battle Headquarter Strategic Riot/protest Vio. Civil Transfer Remote 
        
ln(aid) -0.0801*** -6.87e-06 -0.0180** -0.0151 -0.189*** -0.00533** -0.0204*** 
 (0.0199) (0.00129) (0.00779) (0.0259) (0.0389) (0.00219) (0.00654) 
Conflict 0.312 0.187 0.110 1.249*** 0.267 0.791** 1.154*** 
 (0.205) (0.271) (0.149) (0.246) (0.197) (0.386) (0.400) 
ln(lights) 0.0687*** 0.00405*** 0.00948** -0.00123 0.0842**
* 
0.00640** 0.0259*** 
 (0.0157) (0.00140) (0.00463) (0.0131) (0.0274) (0.00302) (0.00867) 
ln(population) -0.109 0.0279 0.0292 -0.489 -1.468*** 0.0376* -0.183** 
 (0.264) (0.0194) (0.0632) (0.782) (0.405) (0.0203) (0.0773) 
Natural resource rents 0.0152** 0.000731** 0.00535*** 0.00977 0.0158* 0.00180*** 0.00760*** 
 (0.00656) (0.000329) (0.00177) (0.00650) (0.00877) (0.000667) (0.00189) 
Religious tensions 0.370*** -0.000722 0.107*** -0.301* 0.742*** 0.0216*** 0.191*** 
 (0.0993) (0.00383) (0.0335) (0.159) (0.214) (0.00814) (0.0531) 
Ethnic tensions -0.115** 0.00820** 0.00162 0.101 -0.391*** 0.0298* -0.0615*** 
 (0.0557) (0.00374) (0.0184) (0.0791) (0.0955) (0.0156) (0.0190) 
Military in politics 0.0549 0.00256 0.0133 -0.0941 0.198*** 0.0162* 0.00760 
 (0.0615) (0.00279) (0.0148) (0.0698) (0.0678) (0.00856) (0.0114) 
        
Observations 9,615 9,615 9,615 9,615 9,615 9,615 9,615 
R-squared 0.059 0.041 0.015 0.292 0.017 0.362 0.279 
Number of id 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 
ADM2 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
p-value of F 0.0000 0.0062 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0001 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 502.969 508.395 505.663 493.850 502.691 506.590 502.943 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 259.131 263.753 262.184 259.650 257.993 263.381 262.629 
Stock-Yogo 10% value 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 
Hansen test 0.4077 0.0005 0.5750 0.0214 0.1006 0.5577 0.0049 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 








Table 3.8: Conflict Fatalities by Type 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Battle Headquarter Strategic Riot/protest Vio. Civil Transfer Remote 
        
ln(aid) -0.851*** 0.000353 -0.00112 -0.0399*** -0.383** - -0.0609*** 
 (0.204) (0.000305) (0.00121) (0.0151) (0.157) - (0.0218) 
Conflict -0.0408 -0.0313 -0.486 0.457 -0.268  -0.0981 
 (0.0416) (0.0439) (0.365) (0.281) (0.178)  (0.116) 
ln(lights) 0.436** -5.22e-06 0.000904 0.00764 0.102 - 0.0152 
 (0.189) (7.61e-05) (0.000915) (0.0108) (0.115) - (0.0243) 
ln(population) -5.768*** -0.000496 -0.0116 -0.174 -2.981*** - -0.300 
 (1.930) (0.000630) (0.0123) (0.209) (1.091) - (0.223) 
Natural resource rents 0.0408 -9.62e-05 2.42e-05 0.00541 -0.170*** - -0.00205 
 (0.0608) (9.09e-05) (0.000209) (0.00523) (0.0622) - (0.00719) 
Religious tensions 5.212*** -0.000819 0.00939 -0.188 1.157* - 0.549*** 
 (1.183) (0.000737) (0.00869) (0.143) (0.696) - (0.207) 
Ethnic tensions -0.831 0.000409 -0.00185 -0.0801 0.0894 - -0.125** 
 (0.679) (0.000355) (0.00382) (0.0687) (0.309) - (0.0627) 
Military in politics -0.436 -0.000225 -0.00130 -0.0109 -0.643*** - -0.0832* 
 (0.404) (0.000217) (0.00202) (0.0508) (0.201) - (0.0432) 
        
Observations 9,615 9,615 9,615 9,615 9,615 - 9,615 
R-squared -0.012 0.002 0.063 0.253 0.059 - 0.034 
Number of id 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 - 3,205 
ADM2 FE YES YES YES YES YES - YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES - YES 
p-value of F 0.0000 0.9993 0.2060 0.0064 0.0000 - 0.0024 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 508.440 507.232 506.924 506.500 506.672 - 506.743 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 264.238 263.956 264.104 263.612 263.298 - 263.463 
Stock-Yogo 10% value 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 - 19.93 
Hansen test 0.1320 0.6602 0.1359 0.0059 0.0581 - 0.1141 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 








Table 3.9: Restricted Model with Night Lights per capita 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Occurrence Occurrence Occurrence Occurrence Fatalities Fatalities Fatalities Fatalities 
         
ln(aid) -0.343*** -0.406*** -0.252*** -0.0127 -1.990*** -2.145*** -1.252*** -0.307** 
 (0.101) (0.111) (0.0727) (0.0200) (0.381) (0.419) (0.319) (0.137) 
Conflict 0.563*** 0.566*** 0.521*** 0.339** -0.109 -0.112 -0.0694 -0.000782 
 (0.135) (0.136) (0.178) (0.149) (0.0673) (0.0682) (0.0657) (0.00310) 
ln(lights/population)  19.10*** 13.59*** 6.755  50.94*** 31.94*** -4.881 
  (5.581) (4.806) (4.441)  (15.80) (10.82) (9.918) 
Natural resource rents   0.0479*** 0.00866   -0.114 -0.348*** 
   (0.0169) (0.0112)   (0.110) (0.0982) 
Religious tensions   0.848** 0.270**   6.375*** 0.714 
   (0.405) (0.129)   (1.619) (0.978) 
Ethnic tensions   -0.286 0.813***   -0.734 -0.734 
   (0.177) (0.239)   (0.885) (1.149) 
Military in politics   0.169 0.343***   -1.138** 0.0561 
   (0.143) (0.133)   (0.542) (0.541) 
         
Observations 11,538 11,433 9,612 12,816 11,538 11,433 9,612 12,816 
R-squared 0.141 0.130 0.135 0.130 -0.042 -0.052 -0.002 0.008 
Number of id 3,846 3,811 3,204 3,204 3,846 3,811 3,204 3,204 
ADM2 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
p-value of F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 281.582 240.625 548.007 - 282.403 241.428 551.395 - 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 146.614 116.632 257.212 - 147.168 117.256 262.451 - 
Stock-Yogo 10% value 19.93 19.93 19.93 - 19.93 19.93 19.93 - 
Hansen test 0.0030 0.0063 0.3603 - 0.9886 0.8613 0.9130 - 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 








Table 3.10: Restricted Model: Conflict by Time Precision 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Day occurrence Week occurrence Month occurrence Day fatalities Week fatalities Month fatalities 
       
ln(aid) -0.210*** -0.0455*** -0.00193 -1.110*** -0.0955 -0.0397 
 (0.0625) (0.0139) (0.00644) (0.252) (0.0971) (0.0290) 
Conflict 0.508*** 0.522** -0.210 -0.0888 -0.0762 -0.240 
 (0.147) (0.262) (0.134) (0.0754) (0.0809) (0.250) 
ln(lights/population) 12.34*** 1.346*** 0.0160 27.65*** 2.490 1.059 
 (4.498) (0.485) (0.201) (8.932) (2.670) (0.936) 
Natural resource rents 0.0393*** 0.00926*** 0.00335** -0.0998 -0.0236 0.00606 
 (0.0150) (0.00300) (0.00134) (0.0900) (0.0287) (0.00988) 
Religious tensions 0.770** 0.0904** 0.0141 6.026*** 0.143 0.182 
 (0.375) (0.0439) (0.0194) (1.443) (0.316) (0.146) 
Ethnic tensions -0.305* -0.0535** 0.0178 -0.575 -0.0465 -0.0482 
 (0.163) (0.0259) (0.0144) (0.815) (0.129) (0.0683) 
Military in politics 0.0944 0.0191 -0.0170 -0.973** -0.100 -0.0974 
 (0.127) (0.0180) (0.0164) (0.484) (0.0821) (0.0613) 
       
Observations 9,612 9,612 9,612 9,612 9,612 9,612 
R-squared 0.126 0.167 0.068 0.005 0.019 0.087 
Number of id 3,204 3,204 3,204 3,204 3,204 3,204 
ADM2 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
p-value of F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0020 0.1046 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 548.486 549.917 552.093 549.836 550.184 549.794 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 257.123 261.468 264.034 262.360 262.236 262.231 
Stock-Yogo 10% value 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 
Hansen test 0.1227 0.3861 0.0003 0.8373 0.3891 0.8447 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 








Table 3.11: Restricted Model: Conflict Occurrences by Type 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Battle Headquarter Strategic Riot/protest Vio. Civil Transfer Remote 
        
ln(aid) -0.0851*** -0.000638 -0.0200*** -0.0104 -0.182*** -0.00670*** -0.0195*** 
 (0.0215) (0.00138) (0.00767) (0.0235) (0.0378) (0.00257) (0.00594) 
Conflict 0.312 0.186 0.110 1.244*** 0.267 0.790** 1.155*** 
 (0.205) (0.271) (0.149) (0.244) (0.197) (0.386) (0.400) 
ln(lights/population) 1.807** 0.00568 0.464* 2.374 7.054*** 0.184** 0.438** 
 (0.727) (0.0405) (0.264) (2.571) (1.914) (0.0849) (0.213) 
Natural resource rents 0.0156** 0.000732** 0.00536*** 0.00977 0.0166* 0.00180*** 0.00786*** 
 (0.00650) (0.000326) (0.00176) (0.00644) (0.00882) (0.000669) (0.00195) 
Religious tensions 0.393*** 0.00289 0.117*** -0.332** 0.686*** 0.0288*** 0.183*** 
 (0.0983) (0.00358) (0.0312) (0.145) (0.202) (0.0105) (0.0500) 
Ethnic tensions -0.127** 0.00595** -0.00278 0.125* -0.343*** 0.0261* -0.0582*** 
 (0.0607) (0.00286) (0.0168) (0.0733) (0.0869) (0.0141) (0.0172) 
Military in politics 0.0793 0.00464 0.0174 -0.106 0.201*** 0.0194** 0.0146 
 (0.0648) (0.00326) (0.0148) (0.0658) (0.0625) (0.00974) (0.0109) 
        
Observations 9,612 9,612 9,612 9,612 9,612 9,612 9,612 
R-squared 0.053 0.037 0.010 0.292 0.024 0.351 0.279 
Number of id 3,204 3,204 3,204 3,204 3,204 3,204 3,204 
ADM2 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
p-value of F 0.0000 0.0037 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0001 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 548.389 551.608 548.818 535.958 544.572 549.928 545.835 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 257.917 262.706 260.784 258.358 255.533 262.392 260.850 
Stock-Yogo 10% value 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 
Hansen test 0.3776 0.0005 0.6186 0.0197 0.1148 0.6668 0.0053 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 








Table 3.12: Restricted Model: Conflict Fatalities by Type 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Battle Headquarter Strategic Riot/protest Vio. Civil Transfer Remote 
        
ln(aid) -0.817*** 0.000382 -0.000996 -0.0381*** -0.353** - -0.0579*** 
 (0.200) (0.000329) (0.00110) (0.0139) (0.163) - (0.0204) 
Conflict -0.0405 -0.0313 -0.486 0.457 -0.268  -0.0981 
 (0.0416) (0.0438) (0.365) (0.281) (0.178)  (0.116) 
ln(lights/population) 20.83*** -0.00997 0.0123 0.625 9.970** - 0.913 
 (6.992) (0.00870) (0.0232) (0.652) (4.759) - (1.318) 
Natural resource rents 0.0454 -9.50e-05 3.71e-05 0.00544 -0.169*** - -0.00193 
 (0.0610) (9.01e-05) (0.000219) (0.00521) (0.0619) - (0.00719) 
Religious tensions 4.955*** -0.000962 0.00863 -0.199 0.967 - 0.530*** 
 (1.126) (0.000858) (0.00802) (0.133) (0.707) - (0.198) 
Ethnic tensions -0.654 0.000451 -0.00146 -0.0725 0.218 - -0.113** 
 (0.646) (0.000391) (0.00346) (0.0664) (0.316) - (0.0566) 
Military in politics -0.377 -0.000229 -0.00115 -0.0120 -0.667*** - -0.0836* 
 (0.377) (0.000231) (0.00206) (0.0479) (0.200) - (0.0435) 
        
Observations 9,612 9,612 9,612 9,612 9,612 - 9,612 
R-squared -0.009 0.000 0.063 0.254 0.061 - 0.035 
Number of id 3,204 3,204 3,204 3,204 3,204 - 3,204 
ADM2 FE YES YES YES YES YES - YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES - YES 
p-value of F 0.0000 0.9980 0.1463 0.0281 0.0000 - 0.0029 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 551.761 550.205 550.247 549.804 549.935 - 550.006 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 262.725 262.308 262.586 262.117 261.880 - 261.963 
Stock-Yogo 10% value 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 - 19.93 
Hansen test 0.1431 0.6400 0.1345 0.0058 0.0584 - 0.1104 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 








Table 3.13: Restricted Model with Squared Aid 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Occurrence Occurrence Occurrence Occurrence Fatalities Fatalities Fatalities Fatalities 
         
ln(aid) -0.343*** -0.410*** -0.255*** -0.0130 -1.990*** -2.155*** -1.256*** -0.307** 
 (0.101) (0.112) (0.0728) (0.0200) (0.381) (0.422) (0.320) (0.137) 
Conflict 0.563*** 0.566*** 0.520*** 0.339** -0.109 -0.112 -0.0694 -0.000783 
 (0.135) (0.136) (0.178) (0.149) (0.0673) (0.0682) (0.0657) (0.00310) 
ln(lights/population)  20.60*** 15.84*** 8.475  57.54*** 34.63*** -6.986 
  (6.377) (5.530) (5.187)  (18.68) (12.02) (12.21) 
(ln(lights/population))2  -0.0862 -0.148** -0.128**  -0.384 -0.177 0.157 
  (0.118) (0.0684) (0.0651)  (0.320) (0.155) (0.182) 
Natural resource rents   0.0478*** 0.00819   -0.114 -0.347*** 
   (0.0169) (0.0112)   (0.110) (0.0982) 
Religious tensions   0.859** 0.272**   6.389*** 0.711 
   (0.406) (0.129)   (1.623) (0.978) 
Ethnic tensions   -0.287 0.812***   -0.735 -0.733 
   (0.177) (0.239)   (0.885) (1.149) 
Military in politics   0.166 0.342***   -1.142** 0.0574 
   (0.143) (0.132)   (0.541) (0.541) 
         
Observations 11,538 11,433 9,612 12,816 11,538 11,433 9,612 12,816 
R-squared 0.141 0.129 0.134 0.131 -0.042 -0.053 -0.002 0.008 
Number of id 3,846 3,811 3,204 3,204 3,846 3,811 3,204 3,204 
ADM2 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
p-value of F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 281.582 237.378 545.703 - 282.403 238.191 549.147 - 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 146.614 114.548 255.306 - 147.168 115.181 260.612 - 
Stock-Yogo 10% value 19.93 19.93 19.93 - 19.93 19.93 19.93 - 
Hansen test 0.0030 0.0065 0.3689 - 0.9886 0.8486 0.9156 - 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 








Table 3.14: Restricted Model with Squared Aid: Conflict by Time Precision 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Day occurrence Week occurrence Month occurrence Day Fatalities Week Fatalities Month Fatalities 
       
ln(aid) -0.213*** -0.0457*** -0.00192 -1.914*** -0.254 -0.0618 
 (0.0627) (0.0139) (0.00646) (0.539) (0.242) (0.0477) 
Conflict 0.508*** 0.522** -0.210 -0.427 -0.159 -0.0136 
 (0.147) (0.262) (0.134) (0.295) (0.263) (0.0505) 
ln(lights/population) 14.44*** 1.514*** 0.0154 59.55*** 9.618 2.176 
 (5.191) (0.532) (0.221) (21.86) (8.154) (1.434) 
(ln(lights/population))2 -0.138** -0.0110* 1.76e-05 -0.298 -0.0540 -0.0113 
 (0.0629) (0.00663) (0.00144) (0.269) (0.0569) (0.0110) 
Natural resource rents 0.0393*** 0.00925*** 0.00334** 0.0545 -0.0206 0.00339 
 (0.0150) (0.00300) (0.00134) (0.179) (0.0607) (0.0169) 
Religious tensions 0.780** 0.0912** 0.0140 11.24*** 0.360 0.213 
 (0.376) (0.0441) (0.0195) (2.733) (0.744) (0.160) 
Ethnic tensions -0.306* -0.0535** 0.0179 -2.147* -0.151 -0.175** 
 (0.163) (0.0259) (0.0144) (1.126) (0.316) (0.0878) 
Military in politics 0.0911 0.0188 -0.0170 0.726 -0.0320 0.00667 
 (0.127) (0.0180) (0.0164) (0.748) (0.166) (0.0487) 
       
Observations 9,612 9,612 9,612 9,612 9,612 9,612 
R-squared 0.125 0.166 0.068 0.068 0.008 -0.004 
Number of id 3,204 3,204 3,204 3,204 3,204 3,204 
ADM2 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
p-value of F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.1702 0.6669 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 546.164 547.676 549.847 549.497 547.526 547.093 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 255.191 259.631 262.173 260.889 259.947 259.961 
Stock-Yogo 10% value 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 
Hansen test 0.1266 0.3818 0.0003 0.0856 0.2987 0.9490 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 








Table 3.15: Restricted Model with Squared Aid: Conflict Occurrences by Type 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Battle Headquarter Strategic Riot/protest Vio. Civil Transfer Remote 
        
ln(aid) -0.0852*** -0.000634 -0.0201*** -0.0110 -0.183*** -0.00672*** -0.0196*** 
 (0.0216) (0.00138) (0.00769) (0.0236) (0.0380) (0.00258) (0.00596) 
Conflict 0.312 0.186 0.110 1.243*** 0.266 0.790** 1.155*** 
 (0.205) (0.271) (0.149) (0.244) (0.196) (0.386) (0.400) 
ln(lights/population) 1.948** 0.00507 0.514* 2.985 7.963*** 0.202** 0.474* 
 (0.814) (0.0442) (0.293) (3.026) (2.145) (0.0934) (0.243) 
(ln(lights/population))2 -0.00925 3.48e-05 -0.00328 -0.0401 -0.0598** -0.00118 -0.00236 
 (0.0104) (0.000280) (0.00326) (0.0331) (0.0280) (0.00105) (0.00280) 
Natural resource rents 0.0156** 0.000732** 0.00536*** 0.00975 0.0166* 0.00180*** 0.00786*** 
 (0.00650) (0.000326) (0.00176) (0.00644) (0.00882) (0.000669) (0.00195) 
Religious tensions 0.394*** 0.00287 0.117*** -0.329** 0.691*** 0.0289*** 0.184*** 
 (0.0986) (0.00359) (0.0313) (0.145) (0.203) (0.0105) (0.0500) 
Ethnic tensions -0.127** 0.00596** -0.00280 0.125* -0.344*** 0.0261* -0.0582*** 
 (0.0608) (0.00287) (0.0168) (0.0732) (0.0871) (0.0141) (0.0172) 
Military in politics 0.0790 0.00464 0.0173 -0.107 0.200*** 0.0194** 0.0145 
 (0.0647) (0.00325) (0.0148) (0.0659) (0.0624) (0.00973) (0.0109) 
        
Observations 9,612 9,612 9,612 9,612 9,612 9,612 9,612 
R-squared 0.053 0.037 0.010 0.293 0.023 0.351 0.279 
Number of id 3,204 3,204 3,204 3,204 3,204 3,204 3,204 
ADM2 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
p-value of F 0.0000 0.0066 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0001 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 546.140 549.362 546.571 534.182 542.312 547.688 543.591 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 256.086 260.856 258.936 256.810 253.686 260.536 258.990 
Stock-Yogo 10% value 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 
Hansen test 0.3761 0.0005 0.6206 0.0191 0.1169 0.6705 0.0053 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 








Table 3.16: Restricted Model with Squared Aid: Conflict Fatalities by Type 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Battle Headquarter Strategic Riot/protest Vio. Civil Transfer Remote 
        
ln(aid) -0.819*** 0.000383 -0.000997 -0.0381*** -0.354** - -0.0579*** 
 (0.201) (0.000330) (0.00110) (0.0139) (0.164) - (0.0205) 
Conflict -0.0405 -0.0313 -0.486 0.457 -0.268  -0.0981 
 (0.0416) (0.0438) (0.365) (0.281) (0.178)  (0.116) 
ln(lights/population) 22.65*** -0.0107 0.0121 0.670 10.82** - 0.924 
 (7.791) (0.00939) (0.0245) (0.749) (5.202) - (1.564) 
(ln(lights/population))2 -0.119 5.08e-05 1.21e-05 -0.00297 -0.0561 - -0.000787 
 (0.0998) (6.24e-05) (0.000123) (0.00777) (0.0513) - (0.0173) 
Natural resource rents 0.0454 -9.50e-05 3.72e-05 0.00544 -0.169*** - -0.00193 
 (0.0610) (9.00e-05) (0.000219) (0.00521) (0.0619) - (0.00719) 
Religious tensions 4.965*** -0.000966 0.00863 -0.199 0.970 - 0.530*** 
 (1.128) (0.000861) (0.00803) (0.133) (0.708) - (0.198) 
Ethnic tensions -0.655 0.000451 -0.00146 -0.0725 0.217 - -0.113** 
 (0.646) (0.000391) (0.00346) (0.0664) (0.316) - (0.0567) 
Military in politics -0.380 -0.000228 -0.00114 -0.0120 -0.668*** - -0.0836* 
 (0.377) (0.000231) (0.00206) (0.0479) (0.199) - (0.0434) 
        
Observations 9,612 9,612 9,612 9,612 9,612 - 9,612 
R-squared -0.009 -0.000 0.063 0.254 0.061 - 0.035 
Number of id 3,204 3,204 3,204 3,204 3,204 - 3,204 
ADM2 FE YES YES YES YES YES - YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES - YES 
p-value of F 0.0000 0.9993 0.2028 0.0436 0.0000 - 0.0051 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 549.509 547.964 548.007 547.566 547.695 - 547.766 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 260.884 260.461 260.736 260.270 260.037 - 260.118 
Stock-Yogo 10% value 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 - 19.93 
Hansen test 0.1440 0.6391 0.1344 0.0058 0.0581 - 0.1102 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 








Table 3.17: Total Conflict Regression with Squared Aid 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Occurrence Occurrence Occurrence Fatalities Fatalities Fatalities 
ln(aid) -0.131 -0.123 -0.133 -1.718** -1.492* -1.503* 
 (0.187) (0.197) (0.198) (0.745) (0.784) (0.786) 
(ln(aid))2 -0.00356 -0.00389 -0.00355 0.0523 0.0393 0.0397 
 (0.00886) (0.00911) (0.00913) (0.0374) (0.0383) (0.0384) 
Conflict 0.524*** 0.524*** 0.524*** -0.0700 -0.0700 -0.0699 
 (0.177) (0.177) (0.177) (0.0656) (0.0656) (0.0656) 
ln(lights) 0.206***   0.717***   
 (0.0473)   (0.272)   
ln(population) -2.198   -0.206   
 (1.351)   (3.049)   
ln(lights/population)  12.24*** 17.19***  13.21 18.47 
  (4.523) (5.689)  (8.276) (12.27) 
Natural resource rents 0.0417** 0.0437*** 0.0433*** -0.208* -0.200* -0.201* 
 (0.0163) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.113) (0.114) (0.114) 
Religious tensions 0.653 0.605 0.623 4.771*** 4.803*** 4.822*** 
 (0.406) (0.412) (0.414) (1.568) (1.636) (1.644) 
Ethnic tensions -0.198 -0.144 -0.150 -0.354 -0.299 -0.306 
 (0.203) (0.218) (0.218) (1.038) (1.085) (1.086) 
Military in politics 0.0579 0.0922 0.0865 -1.479** -1.326** -1.332** 
 (0.160) (0.165) (0.165) (0.598) (0.603) (0.601) 
       
Observations 9,615 9,612 9,612 9,615 9,612 9,612 
R-squared 0.143 0.144 0.144 0.014 0.014 0.014 
Number of id 3,205 3,204 3,204 3,205 3,204 3,204 
ADM2 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
p-value of F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 182.820 159.984 159.704 181.116 158.195 157.954 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 143.396 126.320 126.245 141.606 124.655 124.600 
Stock-Yogo 10% value 16.87 16.87 16.87 16.87 16.87 16.87 
Hansen test 0.2127 0.2467 0.2418 0.0005 0.0003 0.0003 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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